

Stalin: *Speech at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU 1928 (Translated)*

I will speak, comrades, on the three main questions posed in the theses of the Politburo.

On the issue of the industrialization of the country and that the commanding factor in industrialization is the development of the production of means of production while ensuring the fastest possible pace of this development.

Then, on the issue that the pace of development of agriculture in our country lags excessively behind the rate of development of the industry and that therefore the most burning issue of our time in our internal policy is the question of agriculture, and especially the issue of the grain problem, how to raise, reconstruct agriculture based on new technology.

And finally, the third question is the question of deviations from the party line, of fighting on two fronts and that the main danger at the moment is our right-wing danger, right-leaning.

I

THE QUESTION OF THE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT TEMP.

The starting point of our theses is that the fast pace of development of industry in general, the production of means of production in particular, is the main beginning and key of the industrialization of the country, the main beginning and key of the transformation of our entire national economy on the basis of socialist development.

But what does the rapid pace of industry development mean? This means - more capital investment in the industry. And this leads to the tension of all our plans, both budgetary and extrabudgetary. Indeed, the characteristic feature of our control figures for the last three years, for the period of reconstruction, is that they are compiled and carried out under the sign of tension. Will you take our control figures, will you look at our budget estimates, will you have a talk with our party comrades, both with those who work in the line of party organizations and with those who lead our Soviet, economic and cooperative construction, everywhere and in all through one characteristic feature - the intensity of our plans.

The question arises, do we really need this intensity of plans? Is it possible to do without tension? Is it not possible to carry out work at a slower pace, in a more "calm" atmosphere? Does the rapid pace of industry development that we have taken account for the restless nature of the members of the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars?

Of course not! In the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars there are sober and calm people. Speaking abstractly, distracting from the external and internal situation, we could, of course, conduct business at a slower pace. But the fact is that, firstly, one cannot be distracted from the external and internal situation and, secondly, if we proceed from the environment around us, then it must be admitted that it is this situation that dictates the fast pace of development of our industry. .

Let me turn to the consideration of this situation, these conditions of external and internal order, which dictate to us the rapid pace of development of the industry.

Ambient conditions. We came to power in a country whose technology is terribly backward. Along with a few large industrial units, more or less based on new technology, we have

hundreds and thousands of factories and plants whose machinery does not hold water from the point of view of modern achievements. Meanwhile, we have around us a whole series of capitalist countries that have much more developed and modern industrial equipment than our country. Look at the capitalist countries, and you will see that there the equipment not only goes, but runs straight ahead, overtaking the old forms of industrial technology. And so it turns out that, on the one hand, we have in our country the most advanced Soviet system and the most advanced power in the whole world, Soviet power, on the other hand, we have an excessively backward technique of industry, supposed to represent the base of socialism and Soviet power. Do you think that it is possible to achieve the final victory of socialism in our country with this contradiction?

What needs to be done to eliminate this contradiction? For this it is necessary to achieve in order to catch up and overtake the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We caught up and overtook the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. It's good. But this is not enough. In order to achieve the final victory of socialism in our country, it is also necessary to overtake and overtake these countries also technically and economically. Either we will achieve this, or we will be jammed.

This is true not only in terms of building socialism. This is also true from the point of view of upholding the independence of our country in an environment of capitalist encirclement. It is impossible to defend the independence of our country without a sufficient industrial base for defense. It is impossible to create such an industrial base without possessing the highest technology in industry.

This is what we need and this is what dictates the rapid pace of development of the industry.

The technical and economic backwardness of our country was not invented by us. This backwardness is an age-old backwardness, passed down to us by the entire history of our country. She, this backwardness, was felt as evil before, in the pre-revolutionary period, and after, in the pre-revolutionary period. When Peter the Great, dealing with more developed countries in the West, frantically built plants and factories to supply the army and strengthen the country's defense, it was a kind of attempt to jump out of the backwardness framework. It is quite clear, however, that not one of the old classes, neither the feudal aristocracy, nor the bourgeoisie, could solve the problem of eliminating the backwardness of our country. Moreover, these classes not only could not solve this problem, but they were unable to even put it, this problem, in any satisfactory form. The centuries-old backwardness of our country can be eliminated only on the basis of successful socialist construction. And it can only be eliminated by the proletariat, who built his dictatorship and holds the leadership of the country in his hands. It would be foolish to console ourselves with the fact that since the backwardness of our country was not invented by us, but transferred to us as a legacy of the entire history of our country, we cannot and should not be responsible for it. This is wrong, comrades. Since we have come to power and have taken upon ourselves the task of transforming the country on the basis of socialism, we are responsible and must be responsible for everything, for both the bad and the good. And precisely because we are responsible for everything, we must eliminate our technical and economic backwardness. We must do this if we really want to catch up and overtake the advanced capitalist countries. And only we Bolsheviks can do this. And precisely in order to carry out this task, we must systematically implement the rapid pace of development of our

industry. And that we are already implementing the fast pace of development of the industry, now everyone sees this.

The question of whether to overtake and overtake the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically, this question does not represent for us Bolsheviks anything new or unexpected. This question was raised here in 1917, in the period before the October Revolution. Lenin put it back in September 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, during the period of the imperialist war, in his pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Fight It*. Here is what Lenin said on this score:

"The revolution did that in a few months Russia in its **political** system caught up with the advanced countries. But this is not enough. The war is relentless, it raises the question with ruthless harshness: either die, or overtake the advanced countries and overtake them also **economically** ... Perish, or to rush forward at full speed. So the question is posed by history "(vol. XXI, p. 191).

This is how cool Lenin put the question of eliminating our technical and economic backwardness.

Lenin wrote all this on the eve of the October Revolution, in the period before the proletariat seized power, when the Bolsheviks had neither power, nor socialized industry, nor a wide branch network of cooperation involving millions of peasantry, nor collective farms, nor state farms. Now that we already have something significant in order to eliminate our technical and economic backwardness, we could rephrase Lenin's words in this way:

"We caught up and **overtook the** advanced capitalist countries **politically** , building the dictatorship of the proletariat. But this is not enough. We must use the dictatorship of the proletariat, our socialized industry, transport, credit system, etc., cooperation, collective farms, state farms, etc.

in order to catch up and **overtake the** advanced capitalist countries also **economically**. "

The question of the rapid pace of development of the industry would not be so acute with us as it is now, if we had the same developed industry and the same advanced technology as, say, in Germany, if the specific weight of the industry in the whole national economy we stood as high as, for example, in Germany. **Under this condition**, we could develop the industry at a less rapid pace, not being afraid of falling behind the capitalist countries and knowing that we can outrun them with one blow. But then we would not have the serious technical and economic backwardness that exists now. The fact of the matter is that we stand behind Germany in this respect and we are far from catching up with it in technical and economic terms.

The question of the rapid pace of development of the industry would not be so acute if we did not represent the only country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but one of the countries of the proletarian dictatorship, if we had a proletarian dictatorship not only in our country, but also in others advanced countries, say, in Germany and France.

Under this condition, the capitalist environment could not represent for us the grave danger it poses now, the question of the economic independence of our country, naturally, would fade into the background, we could join the system of more advanced proletarian states, we could receive from them machines for the fertilization of our industry and agriculture, supplying them with raw materials and foodstuffs, we could, therefore, develop our industry at a less rapid rate. But you know well that we do not yet have this condition and we are still the only country of the

proletarian dictatorship surrounded by capitalist countries, many of which stand far ahead of us technically and economically.

That is why the question of catching up and overtaking economically advanced countries was put by Lenin as a matter of life and death for our development.

These are the **external** conditions that dictate to us the fast pace of development of our industry.

Internal conditions . But in addition to external conditions, there are also internal conditions that dictate the rapid pace of development of our industry, as the leading principle of our entire national economy. I mean the excessive backwardness of our agriculture, its technology, its culture. I mean the presence in our country of the overwhelming majority of small commodity producers with their fragmented and completely backward production, in comparison with which our large socialist industry looks like an island in the sea, an island whose base expands every day, but which still represents the island among seas.

We usually say that industry is the leading principle of the entire national economy, including agriculture, that industry is the key with which you can rebuild backward and fragmented farming on the basis of collectivism. This is absolutely true. And from this we must not retreat for a minute. But it must be remembered that if the industry is the leading beginning, then agriculture represents the basis for the development of the industry both as a market that absorbs the products of the industry, as a supplier of raw materials and food, and as a source of export reserves necessary to import equipment for National economy. Is it possible to move the industry forward, leaving agriculture in conditions of completely backward technology, without providing an agricultural base for the industry, without reconstructing agriculture and not driving it to industry? No you can not.

Hence, the task is to maximally provide agriculture with the tools and means of production necessary in order to speed up and move forward the matter of its reconstruction on a new technical basis. But in order to achieve this goal, we need a fast pace of development of our industry. Of course, the reconstruction of fragmented and dispersed agriculture is incomparably more difficult than the reconstruction of a unified and centralized socialist industry. But this task stands before us, and we must solve it. And it is impossible to resolve it except on the basis of the rapid pace of industrial development.

It is impossible without end, that is, for too long a period of time, to base Soviet power and socialist construction on two **different** bases, on the basis of the largest and most unified socialist industry and on the basis of the most fragmented and backward small-scale peasant economy. It is necessary gradually, but systematically and persistently to transfer agriculture to a new technical base, to a large-scale production base, pulling it towards the socialist industry. Either we solve this problem, and then the final victory of socialism in our country is secured, or we will step back from it, we will not solve this problem, and then a return to capitalism may become inevitable.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

“While we live in a small-peasant country, there is a stronger economic base for capitalism in Russia than for communism. It needs to be remembered. Everyone who carefully watched the village’s life, compared to the city’s life, knows that we haven’t pulled the roots of capitalism. The basis of the internal enemy was not undermined. The latter keeps on small farming, and in order

to undermine it, there is one means - to transfer the country's economy, including agriculture, to a new technical base, to the technical base of a modern large-scale production. Twa. Such a base is only electricity. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country "(Vol. XXVI, p. 46).

As you see, under the electrification of the country, Lenin does not understand the isolated construction of separate power plants, but the gradual "transfer of the country's economy , **including agriculture** * , to a new technical base, to the technical base of modern large-scale production" connected in one way or another, directly or indirectly with the matter of electrification.

Lenin spoke this speech at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920, just before the introduction of NEP, when he substantiated the so-called electrification plan, that is, the Goelro plan. Some comrades say on atom the basis that the provisions expressed in this quotation are not applicable to the present reality.

Why, one wonders? Therefore, they say that since then much water has flowed. It is, of course, true that much water has flowed since then. We now have a developed socialist industry, we have collective farms, as a mass phenomenon, we have old and new state farms, we have a rich network of developed cooperative organizations, we have rolling points for servicing peasant farms, we are now using the contracting method, as a new form of bond, and we can use all these and a number of other levers in order to gradually transfer agriculture to the base of the new technology. All this is true. But it is also true that, in spite of all this, we are still a small-peasant country, with a predominance of small-scale production. And this is the main thing. And while this basic remains, Lenin's thesis that "

The same is said by Lenin, but in a sharper form, in his plan of the pamphlet On Prodnalog, written **after the** introduction of NEP (March-April 1921):

" **If** electrification is in 10–20 years, the individualism of the small farmer and his free trade in local circulation are not in the least terrible. **If** not electrification, a return to capitalism is inevitable **anyway** ."

And further in the same place:

"10–20 years of correct relations with the peasantry ensured a victory on a global scale (even when proletarian revolutions that grow) are tightened, otherwise 20–40 years of torment of the White Guard terror" (Vol. XXVI, p. 313).

This is how cool the question is about Lenin: either electrification, that is, "the transfer of the country's economy, including agriculture, to a new technical base, to the technical base of modern large-scale production," or a return to capitalism.

That is how Lenin understands the question of "correct relations with the peasantry."

The point here is not to caress the peasant and to see the installation of the right relationship with him, because you will not get away with caress, but the point is to help the peasant to transfer his farm "to a new technical base, to the technical base of modern large-scale production" , for this is the main way of ridding the peasantry of poverty.

And it is impossible to transfer the country's economy to a new technical base without the rapid pace of development of our industry and, above all, the production of means of production.

This is the case with the internal conditions that dictate the rapid pace of development of the industry.

These are the conditions under which the external and internal order determines the intensity of the control figures of our national economy.

This is where the basis for the fact that our economic plans, both budgetary and extrabudgetary, are under our sign of tension, under the sign of serious investments in capital construction, with the aim of maintaining the rapid pace of development of the industry. It may be asked, where is it stated in the theses, in which place of the theses? (A voice: "Yes, where is it said?") The sum of capital investments in industry for the year 1928/29 speaks about this in the theses. After all, theses are called theses on the control figures. So it seems, comrades? (A voice: "Yes.") So these theses say that we invest in industry for capital works in 1928/29, 1,650 million rubles. In other words, we are investing 330 million rubles more in industry this year than last year.

It turns out, therefore, that we not only maintain the pace of development of the industry, but take another step forward, investing more in industry than last year, that is, raising capital work in industry both absolutely and relatively.

This is the crux of theses on the control figures of the national economy. And some comrades did not even notice the elephant. The theses on the check figures were criticized at random for small things, but they were not noticed the most important.

II

GRAIN PROBLEM

I have spoken so far about the first main question of the theses, about the pace of development of the industry. We now turn to the second main question, the question of the grain problem. A characteristic feature of the theses is that they place emphasis on the problem of the development of agriculture in general, grain farming in particular. Is this setting theses correct? I think that is correct. Even at the July plenum it was said that the most bottleneck in the development of our national economy is the **excessive** backwardness of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular.

When, in saying that agriculture lags behind industry in our country, complain about this circumstance, this, of course, is not serious. Agriculture has always lagged behind and will lag behind industry. This is especially true in our conditions, where industry is as concentrated as possible and agriculture is as dispersed as possible. It is clear that the combined industry will grow faster than sprayed agriculture. This, by the way, implies the leading role of industry in relation to agriculture. Therefore, the usual lag of agriculture from industry does not give any grounds for raising the problem of grain.

The problem of agriculture and, in particular, grain farming appears on the scene only when the usual lagging of agriculture from industry turns into an **excessive** backwardness of the pace of its development. A characteristic feature of the current state of the national economy is that we have in front of us an **excessive** lag in the pace of development of grain farming from the pace of development of the industry, as a fact, with a huge increase in demand for marketable bread from growing cities and industrial centers. The task is not to **reduce** the pace of development of the industry to the level of development of grain farming (this would confuse everything and turn development back), and to adjust the development of grain farming to the pace of development of the industry and raise the pace of development of grain farming to a level that ensures rapid progress of the whole national economy, and industry, and agriculture.

Either we solve this problem, and thus the grain problem will be solved, or we will not solve it, and then the gap between the socialist city and the small-peasant village is inevitable.

So we have a question, comrades. That is the essence of the grain problem.

Does this mean that we are now dealing with "stagnation" in the development of grain farming or even with its "degradation"? Frumkin poses the question precisely in his second letter, which we distributed today at his request to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. He directly says in this letter that we have "stagnation" in agriculture. "We cannot," he says, "and should not write about degradation in the press, but within the party we should not conceal that this lag is tantamount to degradation."

Is this Frumkin's statement correct? Of course, wrong! We, members of the Politburo, completely disagree with such an assertion, and the theses of the Politburo are fundamentally at variance with the similar coverage of the issue of the state of grain farming.

In fact, what is degradation and how should it be expressed in agriculture? It must be expressed, obviously, in the movement of agriculture backwards, downwards, in the movement from new forms of management to its old, medieval forms. It must be expressed in the transition of the peasantry, say, from the three-field to fishery, from the plow and the machine to the plow, from the cleaned and pure-quality seeds to the unpurified and purebred seeds, from modern farming to lower culture, etc., etc. But do we now see similar facts? Is it not known to everyone and everyone that the peasantry by the tens and hundreds of thousands of yards moves annually from a three-field to a four- and multi-field, from outbred seeds to pure-quality seeds, from a plow to a plow and machines, from a lower crop of agriculture to its highest culture? What is the degradation?

Frumkin likes to grab at all the tails of certain Politburo members to substantiate his point of view. It is quite possible that in this case, he will try to grab Bukharin's coattails in order to prove that Bukharin says "the same thing" in his article "The Economist's Notes". But Bukharin says far from "the same." In his article, Bukharin raised an abstract, theoretical question about the possibility or danger of degradation. Speaking in the abstract, such a formulation of the question is quite possible and logical. And what does Frumkin do? It turns the abstract question of the possibility of degradation into the **fact** of agricultural degradation. And this is called his analysis of the state of grain farming! Isn't that funny, comrades?

Soviet power would be good if it led agriculture to degradation in the eleventh year of its existence! Yes, such power should be driven away, and not supported. And the workers would have banished such power long ago if it had led to the degradation of agriculture. All kinds of bourgeois specialists sing about degradation to us, who sleep and see in their dreams that agriculture is degrading. At one time Trotsky sang about degradation to us. I did not expect Frumkin to take this dubious path.

What does Frumkin base his claim on degradation on? First of all, on the fact that this year, the acreage under grain crops turned out to be. we have less than last year. How to explain this fact? Maybe the policy of the Soviet government? Of course not. This is due to the death of winter crops in the steppe belt of Ukraine and partly in the North Caucasus and drought this summer in the same area of Ukraine. If it were not for these climatic adverse conditions on which agriculture depends entirely and completely, we would have at least a million dessiatinas more crops a year than last year.

He further bases his assertion on the fact that we have only a little more gross grain output this year than last year (by 70 million pounds more), and 200 million pounds less wheat and rye. What explains all this? The same phenomena of drought and death of winter crops from frosts. If there were no these adverse climatic conditions, we would have this year's gross bread production by 300 poods more than last year. How can we be distracted from factors such as drought, frost, etc., which are crucial for the harvest in certain areas?

We now set the task of expanding the sown area by 7 percent, increasing the yield by 3 percent and increasing the gross output of grain crops, it seems, by 10 percent. There can be no doubt that we will take all measures to accomplish these tasks. But it is possible that, despite our measures, we will again run into partial crop failure, freezing or drought in certain areas, and it is possible that these circumstances will lead to a certain decrease in gross grain production in comparison with our plans or even compared with gross output of this year. Will this mean that agriculture is "degrading", that the policy of the Soviet government is to blame for this "degradation", that we have "deprived" the peasant of the economic incentive, that we have "taken away" his economic outlook?

Several years ago, Trotsky fell into the same mistake, arguing that the "rain" does not matter for agriculture. Rykov objected to him with the support of the overwhelming majority of members of the Central Committee. Now Frumkin falls into the same mistake, distracting from the climate conditions that are crucial for agriculture, and trying to shift everything to the policy of our party. What are the ways and methods necessary to increase the pace of development of agriculture in general, grain farming in particular?

There are three such ways or channels:

- a) raising the yield and expanding the acreage of individual poor-middle peasant farms;
- b) the further development of collective farms;
- c) expansion of old and development of new state farms. This was stated in the resolution of the July plenum. The theses repeat what was said at the July plenum, but put the question more specifically, give it a numerical expression in the sense of known investments in this matter. Frumkin found a reason to find fault here. He thinks that if individual farming is put in the first place, and collective and state farms in the second and third, this means nothing but the victory of his point of view. This is ridiculous, comrades. It is clear that if the matter is approached from the point of view of the specific weight of various forms of agriculture, then individual farming should be put in the first place, because it provides almost six times more marketable bread than collective and state farms. But if we approach the matter from the point of view of the type of economy, from the point of view of which of the forms of economy is the closest to us, then in the first place it is necessary to put collective and state farms, representing the highest type of agriculture in comparison with individual peasant farming. Do we still need to prove that both points of view are equally acceptable to us?

What is required in order for us to work on all these three channels in order to achieve practically an increase in the rate of development of agriculture and, above all, grain farming?

For this it is necessary, first of all, to turn the attention of our party cadres towards agriculture and focus it on specific issues of the grain problem. It is necessary to abandon common phrases and talk about agriculture in **general** and, finally, proceed to the development of **practical** measures to raise grain farming in accordance with the various conditions of various

regions. It's time to move from words to deeds and finally tackle the specific question of **how** to increase yields and expand the area of individual poor-middle peasant farms, **how** to improve and develop collective and state farms, **how to** organize collective and state farms assistance to peasants along the supply lines for the best seeds, the best breed of livestock, **how to** organize assistance to the peasants with machines and other tools through rolling centers, **how** to expand and improve the business of contracting and, in general, agricultural cooperation, etc. etc. (A voice: "This is practicality.") Such practicality is absolutely necessary for us, because without it we risk drowning the most serious matter of resolving the grain problem in idle chatter about agriculture in general.

The Central Committee set itself the task of organizing concrete reports of our main workers on the main grain districts in the Council of People's Commissars and in the Politburo on the development of agriculture. At this plenum, you have to hear a report by Comrade Andreev on ways to resolve the grain problem in the North Caucasus. I think that in the future we will have to hear in turn similar reports from Ukraine, the Central Administrative District, the Volga region, Siberia, etc. This is absolutely necessary in order to turn the party's attention towards the grain problem and finally transfer our party cadres to rails specific questions related to the grain problem.

It is necessary, secondly, to ensure that our party workers in the village strictly distinguish the middle peasants from the kulaks in their practical work, do not throw them in one pile and do not fall on the middle peasant when they need to beat their fists. It is time, finally, to eliminate these, if I may say so, mistakes. Take, for example, the question of individual taxation. We have a resolution of the Politburo and the corresponding law on individual taxation of not more than 2-3 percent of households, i.e. the richest part of the kulaks. And what happens in practice? There are a number of areas where 10, 12, and even more percent are levied, thus affecting the middle peasantry. Is it time to put an end to this crime?

And instead of identifying concrete measures to eliminate these and similar disgraces, our dear "critics" excel in words, proposing to replace the words "the richest part of the kulaks" with the words "the most powerful part of the kulaks" or "the most top part of the kulaks." As if this is not the same thing! It has been proven that we have about 5 percent fists. It is proved that the law imposes in the order of individual taxation only 2-3 percent of the households, that is, the richest part of the kulaks. It is proved that in practice this law is violated in a number of areas. And the "critics", instead of identifying concrete measures to eliminate these phenomena, diluted verbal criticism, not wanting to understand that this does not change a bit. Pure nachos! (Voice: " They propose to impose individually all fists. ") Well, then we must demand the repeal of the law on 2-3 percent individual taxation. Meanwhile, I did not hear anyone demanding the repeal of the law on individual taxation. It is said that arbitrary expansion of individual taxation is intended replenishing the local budget. But you cannot replenish the local budget by violating the law, by violating the party directive. The party exists, it has not yet been liquidated. Soviet power exists, it has not yet been liquidated. And if not enough means for the local budget, it is necessary to raise the question of the local budget, and not to violate the laws, not to cancel the instructions of the party. It is said that the arbitrary expansion of individual taxation is intended to replenish the local budget. But you can not replenish the local budget by violating the law, by violating the directive of the party. Our party exists, it has not yet been liquidated. Soviet power exists, it has

not yet been eliminated. And if there are not enough funds for the local budget, it is necessary to raise the question of the local budget, and not to violate the laws, not to cancel the instructions of the party. It is said that the arbitrary expansion of individual taxation is intended to replenish the local budget. But you can not replenish the local budget by violating the law, by violating the directive of the party. Our party exists, it has not yet been liquidated. Soviet power exists, it has not yet been eliminated. And if there are not enough funds for the local budget, it is necessary to raise the question of the local budget, and not to violate the laws, not to cancel the instructions of the party.

It is necessary, then, to develop further the stimulation of individual poor-middle peasant farms. There is no doubt that the increase in the price of bread that has already taken place, the practical implementation of revolutionary legality, the practical assistance to the poor and middle peasant farms by way of contracting, etc., will significantly increase the peasant's economic incentive. Frumkin thinks that we killed or almost killed this incentive, taking the economic perspective away from the peasant. This, of course, is nonsense. If this is true, then it is not clear, on what, in fact, is the link, the alliance of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry? One cannot think that this alliance is a moral alliance. Finally, it is necessary to understand that the union of the working class and the peasantry is a union of calculation, a union of the interests of two classes, a class union of the workers and the main mass of the peasantry, whose goal is mutual advantage. It is clear that if we had killed or almost killed the economic incentive of the peasantry, depriving the peasants of the economic perspective, then we would not have the bond, there would be no alliance of the working class and the peasantry. Obviously, it may not be a matter of "creating" or "unleashing" the economic stimulus of the poor and middle peasants, but of reinforcing this incentive and developing it further to the mutual benefit of the working class but of the main mass of the peasantry. This is exactly what the theses on the control figures of the national economy say. economic incentive to the poor and middle peasants, but to strengthen this incentive and develop it further to the mutual benefit of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry. This is exactly what the theses on the control figures of the national economy say. economic incentive to the poor and middle peasants, but to strengthen this incentive and develop it further to the mutual benefit of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry. This is exactly what the theses on the control figures of the national economy say.

Finally, it is necessary to strengthen the supply of goods to the village. I mean both consumer goods, and especially industrial goods (machinery, fertilizers, etc.) that can increase the production of agricultural products. It cannot be said that in this area everything is well with us. You know that the phenomena of commodity hunger are far from being eliminated and, perhaps, we will not soon be eliminated. In some circles of our party there is an illusion that we can now eliminate the hunger for goods. This, unfortunately, is incorrect. It must be borne in mind that the phenomena of commodity hunger are associated, firstly, with the growing well-being of workers and peasants and the tremendous growth of solvent demand for goods whose production grows annually, but which do not cover all demand, and, secondly, Reconstruction of industry means the movement of means from the production of consumer goods to the production of means of production. Without this, there can be no serious reconstruction of industry, especially in our, Soviet conditions. But what does it mean? This

means that money is invested in the construction of new enterprises, the number of cities and new consumers is growing, while new enterprises can give a new mass of goods only after 3-4 years. It is easy to understand that this circumstance cannot favor the liquidation of commodity hunger.

Does this mean that we must lay down our hands and admit our impotence in front of the phenomena of product hunger? No, it does not mean. The fact is that we can and must take concrete measures to alleviate and temper commodity hunger. This can be done and we must do it now. To do this, you need to click on the strengthening of such industries that are directly related to the rise of agricultural production (Stalingrad Tractor Plant, Rostov Selmash, Voronezh Trier Plant, etc., etc.). To this end, it is necessary, further, to strengthen, to the extent possible, those industries that are associated with an increase in the commodity mass of a deficient nature (cloth, glass, nails, etc.). Etc. etc....

Kubyak said that according to the control figures of the national economy, this year the individual peasant economy is given less money than last year. I think this is wrong. Kubyak, apparently, does not consider the fact that, as a result of contracting, we give the peasants about 300 million rubles of credit this year (almost 100 million more than last year). If this circumstance is taken into account, but it cannot be ignored, it turns out that we are giving more to the development of individual peasant economy this year than last year. As for the old and new state farms and collective farms, about 300 million rubles are invested this year (more than last year, by 150 million).

Special attention should be paid to collective and state farms and the contracting method. We can not consider these things only as a means of enhancing our resources in the line of marketable bread. At the same time, they are a **new form of the bond of the** working class and the main mass of the peasantry.

We have already said enough about the contracting method, and I will not cover it. It is clear to everyone that the method of mass contracting makes it easier to unite the efforts of individual peasant farms, introduces an element of constancy in the relationship between the state and the peasantry, and thus strengthens the link between town and country.

I would like to draw your attention to the collective farms and especially the state farms, as levers that facilitate the transformation of agriculture on the basis of new technology, revolutionize the heads of the peasants and help them to get rid of inertia, from routine. The appearance of tractors, large agricultural machines and tractor columns in our grain areas cannot be in vain for the farms of the surrounding peasants. The help to the surrounding peasants by seeds, machinery, tractors will undoubtedly be appreciated by the peasantry and taken into account as a sign of the strength and power of the Soviet state, trying to bring it to the broad road of a serious rise in agriculture. We have not taken this circumstance into account so far and, perhaps, we still do not take it into account sufficiently. But I think this is the most important thing

Such, in general, are the ways and methods along which our work should be carried out in the matter of resolving the grain problem.

III

ABOUT CLIMBING

And reconciliation with them

We now turn to the third main question of our theses, the question of deviations from the Leninist line.

The social base of biases is the fact of the predominance of the small-scale production of capitalist elements, the fact that our party is surrounded by petty-bourgeois elements, and finally, the fact that certain elements of our party are infected by this element.

Here you are basically a social base of biases. All of them, these biases, are of a petty-bourgeois character.

What is the right deviation, which is mainly referred to here? Where is he pulling? He draws on the line of adaptation to bourgeois ideology, on the line of adapting our policy to the tastes and needs of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

What threatens us right deviation, if he wins in our party? This will be the ideological defeat of our party, the unleashing of capitalist elements, the increase in chances for the restoration of capitalism or, as Lenin said, for a "return to capitalism."

Where do the tendencies to the right bias mainly nest? In our Soviet and economic, cooperative and professional apparatuses, as well as in the party apparatus, especially in its grassroots village links.

Do we have people among the party members who express the right bias? Of course, there is. Rykov cited the example of Shatunovsky, who spoke out against the construction of the Dnieprostoi. There can be no doubt that Shatunovsky made a right deviation, a deviation towards open opportunism. But I think all the same that Shatunovsky is not typical for characterizing the right slope, for characterizing his physiognomy. I think that here the palm must be given to Frumkin. (Laughter.) I mean his first letter (June 1928) and then his second letter, distributed here to members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (November 1928).

Let us examine both of these letters. Take the "main points" of the first letter.

1) **"The village, with the exception of a small part of the poor, is opposed to us."** Is this true? Clearly that is not true. If this were true, then we would not even have a memory of the link. But since June (the letter was written in June) almost half a year has passed, and anyone who is not blind is able to see that the bond of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry remains and is growing stronger. Why does Frumkin write this inconsistency? In order to scare the party and make it compliant with respect to the right slope.

2) **"The installation taken recently has led the main masses of the middle peasant to hopelessness, to hopelessness"**. Is this true? Totally wrong. It is clear that if in the spring of this year we had the economic hopelessness and hopelessness of the majority of the middle peasants, the middle peasants would not expand the spring wedge in all the main areas of bread production. We have spring crops in April - May. Well, Frumkin's letter was written in the month of June. Who is with us, under Soviet power, the main supplier of bread products? The state and related cooperation. It is clear that if the masses of the Middle Ages were suffering from economic hopelessness, if they were in a state of "rummaging" with the Soviet authorities, they would not expand the spring wedge in favor of the state as the main bread-maker. Frumkin says a clear inconsistency. And here Frumkin tries to scare the party with the "horrors" of hopelessness,

3) **"We must return to the XIV and the XV congresses."** That the XV Congress is dragged here neither to the village nor to the city, this is beyond doubt. The salt is not in the XV Congress, but in the slogan: back to the XIV Congress. What does it mean? This means abandoning the "intensification of the offensive against the kulak" (see resolution XV of the Congress). I say this not in order to mock the XIV Congress. I say this to the fact that by his appeal to return to the XIV Congress, Frumkin denies that step forward, which the party went from the XIV to the XVth Congress, and, denying this step forward, he pulls the party back. The July plenum of the Central Committee had a judgment on this issue. He explicitly stated in his resolution that people who are trying to circumvent the decision of the Fifteenth Congress - "to develop further the attack on the kulaks" - are "an expression of bourgeois tendencies in our country." I will tell Frumkin directly that when the Politburo formulated this paragraph of the resolution of the July plenum,

4) **" Maximum assistance to the poor, going to the teams."** We have always rendered maximum assistance to the poor who go to groups or even not to go as far as they can. This is nothing new. What's new in the decisions of the XV Congress in comparison with the XIV Congress is not this, but the fact that the XV Congress set the all-round development of the collective-farm movement as one of the most important tasks of the day. Speaking about the maximum assistance to the poor who go to the collectives, Frumkin essentially makes excuses, unsubscribes from the task of the party about the all-round development of the collective-farm movement, set by the Fifteenth Congress. In essence, Frumkin opposes the deployment of work to strengthen the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of collective farms.

5) **"Do not expand the state farms in shock and super-shock order . "** Frumkin cannot but know that we are just **beginning** to conduct serious work on expanding the old state farms and creating new ones. Frumkin cannot but know that we are giving much less money to this business than we should have given if we had any reserves for this. The words "in shock and super-shock order" are given here in order to bring "horror" on people and thereby cover up their unwillingness to make any serious expansion of state farms. Frumkin essentially speaks here against the strengthening of the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of state farms.

Collect now all these provisions of Frumkin, and you will receive a bouquet characterizing the right slope.

Let us turn to the second letter of Frumkin. What is the difference between the second letter and the first? The fact that it exacerbates the errors of the first letter. The first talked about the futility of the middle peasant economy. And the second says about the "degradation" of agriculture. The first letter said to return to the XIV Congress in the sense of weakening the offensive against the fist. The second letter states that "we should not interfere with the production of kulak farms." The first letter says nothing about industry. And the second letter develops a "new" theory about giving less for industrial construction. However, there are two points on which both letters converge: about collective farms and state farms — and here and there Frumkin speaks out against the deployment of collective farms and state farms. It is clear that the second letter is the aggravation of the mistakes of the first letter.

I already spoke about the theory of "degradation". There can be no doubt that this theory is a fabrication of bourgeois specialists who are ready to shout about the death of Soviet power.

Frumkin let himself be intimidated by bourgeois specialists huddled around Narkomfin, and now he is trying to scare the party, wanting to make it compliant with respect to the right deviation. About the collective and state farms, too, spoke to a sufficient extent. Therefore, do not replay what was said. Let us consider the remaining two points: about the kulak economy and about capital investments in industry.

On the kulak farm . Frumkin says that **"we should not interfere with the production of kulak farms** . " What does it mean? This means not to disturb the kulaks to develop their exploitative economy. But what does it mean not to interfere with the kulaks to develop their exploitative economy? It means unleashing capitalism in the village, giving it freedom, giving it freedom. It turns out the old slogan of the French liberals: "lessen fer, lesse passe", i.e. do not stop the bourgeoisie from doing their job, do not hinder the bourgeoisie from moving freely.

This slogan was exposed by the old French liberals during the French bourgeois revolution, during the struggle against the feudal power, which oppressed the bourgeoisie and did not allow it to develop. It turns out that we must now move from the **socialist** slogan — the ever-increasing limitation of capitalist elements "(see the theses on the control figures) **to the bourgeois-liberal** slogan — not to hamper the development of capitalism in the countryside. Well, do we really think of turning from Bolsheviks into bourgeois liberals? What can be common between this bourgeois-liberal slogan of Frumkin and the line of the party?

(Frumkin: "Comrade Stalin, read other clauses as well.") I read the whole clause: "We must not interfere with the production of kulak farms, **while fighting at the same time with their indentured exploitation**" Well, dear Frumkin, do you really think that the second half of the phrase improves the cause, and does not worsen it? What does the fight against bonded exploitation mean? After all, the slogan of the struggle against bonded exploitation is the slogan of the bourgeois revolution against feudal serfdom or semi-feudal methods of exploitation. We really exhibited this slogan when we went to the bourgeois revolution, making the difference between the enslaving form of exploitation, which we were trying to eliminate, and the non-enslaving, so-called "progressive" form of exploitation, which Then we couldn't limit and destroy Rui, because the bourgeois order remained in force, but then we went to the bourgeois-democratic republic. And now we have, if I'm not mistaken, a socialist revolution that keeps the course and cannot forms of exploitation including "progressive" forms of exploitation. How do you want us to turn back from the socialist revolution that we are developing and moving forward and return to the slogans of the bourgeois revolution? How can you agree to such nonsense?

Further. What does it mean not to interfere with the kulak economy? That means giving a fist a will. What does it mean to give him will? It means giving him power. When the bourgeois liberals of France demanded that the feudal authorities not to hinder the bourgeoisie from developing, they expressed this in specific demands for giving the bourgeoisie power. And they were right. In order to develop properly, the bourgeoisie must have power. So, to be consistent, I must say: pripus fist to power. For it is necessary to understand this, that it is impossible not to hamper the development of the kulak economy, taking power from the kulak and concentrating it in the hands of the working class. Here are the conclusions that suggest itself when reading the second letter of Frumkin.

On the capital construction industry . When discussing the control figures, we had three figures: the Supreme Council of National Economy required 825 million rubles, the State Planning Committee gave 750 million rubles, and the Narkomfin agreed to give only 650 million rubles. What decision did the Central Committee of our party take on this issue? He defined 800 million rubles, *i.e.* exactly 150 million rubles more than Narkomfin suggested. The fact that Narkomfin gave less is not surprising, of course: the stinginess of Narkomfin is well known to all; it cannot but be mean. But this is not the case now. The fact is that Frumkin defends the figure of 650 million rubles not out of stinginess, but on the basis of a new theory of "about possibilities", stating in his second letter and in a special article in the publication Narkomfin, **that we will certainly worsen the cause of our economy if we release the Supreme Council of National Economy for capital construction of more than 650 million rubles.** What does it mean? This means that Frumkin is against preserving the current pace of development of the industry, not realizing that it is obvious that a reduction in this pace would really worsen the situation of our entire national economy.

Now combine these two points in the second letter of Frumkin, the point about kulak economy and the point about capital construction of industry, add to this the theory of "degradation" - and you will get a physiognomy of the right slope.

Do you want to know what the right bias is and what it looks like? Read both letters of Frumkin, study them and understand.

This is the case with the physiognomy of the right slope. But theses speak not only about the right deviation. They also talk about the so-called "Left" bias. What is a "left" bias? Do we really have a so-called "left" bias in the party? Do we have anti-medium tendencies in the party, as we say in our theses, super-industrialistic tendencies, etc.? Yes there is. What do they boil down to? They boil down to Trotskyism. Another July plenum talked about this. I have in mind the well-known resolution of the July plenum on grain procurement policy, which refers to the struggle on two fronts: against those who pull back from the Fifteenth Congress, are right-wing, and against those who want to turn the emergency measures into a permanent party course, this is the "left", the tendency towards Trotskyism.

It is clear that we have elements of Trotskyism and the tendency towards Trotskyist ideology within the party. It seems that up to four thousand people voted against our platform during the discussion before the XV Congress of the party. (A voice: "Ten thousand.") I think that if ten thousand voted against, then twice ten thousand party members sympathizing with Trotskyism did not vote at all, since they did not attend the meetings. These are the very Trotskyist elements who have not left the party and who, presumably, have not yet freed themselves from the Trotskyist ideology. In addition, I think that a part of the Trotskyists, who later broke away from the Trotskyist organization and returned to the party, did not even have time to say goodbye to the Trotskyist ideology and, too, must be not averse to spreading their views among party members. Finally, we have the fact of a certain revival of the Trotskyist ideology in some organizations of our party. Put it all together, and you will receive all the necessary elements in order to have a bias towards Trotskyism in the party.

This is understandable: it cannot be that, in the presence of petty-bourgeois elements and under the pressure of these elements on our party, we do not have Trotskyist tendencies in the party. It is one thing - the cadres of the Trotskyists to arrest or expel from the party. Another thing is to

end the ideology of Trotskyism. It will be harder. And we say: where there is a right bias, there must be a "left" bias. "Left" bias is the shadow of the right bias. Lenin said, referring to the Otzovists, that the "Lefts" are the same Mensheviks, only inside-out. That is absolutely correct. The same must be said about the present "Lefts," People who deviate towards Trotskyism are essentially the same right, just inside-out, right, hiding behind a "left" phrase.

Hence the struggle on two fronts, against the right bias and against the "left" bias.

It can be said: if the "left" bias is essentially the same right opportunistic bias, then where is the difference between them and where are the two fronts actually? In fact, if the victory of the right means raising the chances for the restoration of capitalism, and the victory of the "left" leads to the same results, then what is the difference between them and why are some called the right, others the "left"? And if there is a difference between them, then what is it? Is it not true that both deviations have the same social root, both of them are petty-bourgeois deviations? Is it not true that both of these deviations lead to the same results if they win? What then is the difference between them?

The difference is that they have different platforms, different requirements, different approaches and techniques.

If, for example, the right say: "It was not necessary to build the Dneprostroi", and the "leftists", on the contrary, object: "That we are the only Dneprostroi, give us each year along the Dneprostroi" (laughter), then we must admit that the difference is obvious, there is.

If the Rights say: "Do not touch the fist, let him develop freely" and "left", on the contrary, declare: "Kill not only fists, but also the middle peasants, because he is *the* private owner as the kulak", - it is necessary recognize that there is obviously a difference.

If the rightists say : "**Difficulties have come, is it not time to try** ", and the "leftists", on the contrary, object: "**That we have difficulties, to sneeze us to your difficulties, we fly all the way forward**" (laughter), then we must admit what the difference obviously is.

Here is a picture of a specific platform and specific methods of the "left". This, in fact, explains that the "left" sometimes manages to lure some of the workers to it with the help of the "left" crackling phrases and pretend to be the most determined opponents of the right, although the whole world knows that they have social roots from the "left" the same as the rightists, and they often go to an agreement, to a bloc with the right to fight against the Leninist line.

That is why for us, Leninists, it is imperative to fight on two fronts, both against the right deviation and against the "left" deviation.

But if the Trotskyist tendency represents a "left" bias, does that mean that the "left" are to the left of Leninism? No, it does not mean. Leninism is the leftmost (without quotes) trend in the world labor movement. We, Leninists, were part of the Second International before the period when the imperialist war began, as the extreme left faction of the Social Democrats. We did not remain in the Second International and we preached a split in the Second International because we, precisely as an extreme left faction, did not want to live in the same party with the petty-bourgeois traitors to Marxism, the social pacifists and the social chauvinists.

This tactic and this ideology later became the basis of the Bolshevik parties of the whole world. In our party, we Leninists are the only left without quotes. Therefore, we Leninists are not "left" and not right in our own party. We are the party of Marxist-Leninists. And in our own party we are fighting not only with those whom we call openly opportunistic deviationists, but also those

who want to be "left of" Marxism, "left of" Leninism, covering their right, opportunist nature with "left", snappy phrases.

Everyone will understand that when people who are not yet liberated from Trotskyist tendencies are called "leftists", this must be understood ironically. Lenin called the "Left Communists" left, sometimes in quotes, sometimes without quotes. But everyone will understand that the Left called them Lenin ironically, emphasizing by this that the Left only in words, apparently, but in practice represent petty-bourgeois right tendencies.

What kind of leftism (without quotation marks) of the Trotskyist elements can there be if yesterday they were united in a single anti-Leninist bloc with openly opportunistic elements, merging directly and directly with the anti-Soviet sections of the country? Is it not a fact that yesterday we still had an open bloc of the "left" and the right against the Leninist party, with the undoubted support of this bloc by the bourgeois elements? And does it not mean that they, the "left" and the right, could not unite in a single bloc if they did not have common social roots, if they did not have a common opportunist nature? The block of Trotskyists collapsed a year ago. Part of the right, like Shatunovsky, moved away from the block. Hence, the right-wing blockists will henceforth act as rightists, and the "leftists" will cover their rightfulness with "left-wing" phrases. But what is the guarantee that the "left" and the right will not find each other again? (Laughter.) It is clear that there is not and there can be no guarantee.

But if we stand behind the slogan of struggle on two fronts, does this not mean that we thereby proclaim the need for centrism in our party? What does fighting on two fronts mean? Isn't this centrism? You know that the Trotskyists depict the case in precisely this way: there are "leftists", this, they say, "we" are the Trotskyists, "real Leninists"; there are "rightists", these are all the rest; there are, finally, "centrists" who vacillate between the "left" and the right. Can this view of our party be considered correct? It is clear that it is impossible. Only people who have mixed all the concepts and who have long broken with Marxism can speak like that. Only people who do not see and do not understand the **fundamental difference** between the party of the social democratic period before the war, proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests, and the Communist Party, which is the **monolithic** party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Centrism cannot be regarded as a spatial concept: in one place, say, the right, on the other - the "left", and in the middle - the centrists. Centrism is a political concept. Its ideology is the ideology of adaptation, the ideology of subordinating the proletarian interests to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie as part of **one common party**. This ideology is alien and contrary to Leninism.

Centrism is a natural phenomenon for the Second International of the period before the war. There were right (most), left (without quotation marks) and there were centrists, whose whole policy was to embellish opportunism of the right with left phrases and subordinate the left to the right.

What then was the policy of the Left, whose core was the Bolsheviks? In the decisive struggle against the centrists, in the struggle for a split with the right (especially after the beginning of the imperialist war) and in the organization of the new revolutionary International from among the truly left, really proletarian elements.

Why could such an arrangement of forces within the Second International and such a policy of the Bolsheviks in it then arise? Because the Second International was then a party of a **bloc of** proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests in favor of petty-bourgeois social pacifists,

social-chauvinists. Because the Bolsheviks could not then not concentrate the fire against the centrists, who were trying to subordinate the proletarian elements to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. Because the Bolsheviks were then obliged to preach the idea of a split, for without this the proletarians could not have organized their own monolithic revolutionary Marxist party.

Is it possible to assert that in our Communist Party there is the same disposition of forces and that it should be practiced by the same policies that the Bolsheviks practiced in the parties of the Second International of the period before the war? It is clear that it is impossible. It is impossible, since it would mean not to understand the **fundamental difference** between Social Democracy, as a party of a bloc of proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements, and a **monolithic** Communist Party of the revolutionary proletariat. There (the social democracy) had one class foundation of the party. Here (the Communists) a completely different basis of the party. There (among social democracy) centrism was a natural phenomenon, since the party of a bloc of heterogeneous interests could not do without centrists, and the Bolsheviks were obliged to lead the line of schism. Here (among the communists), centrism is pointless and incompatible with Lenin's party spirit, since the communist party is the **monolithic** party of the proletariat, and not the party of the bloc of heterogeneous class elements.

And since the dominant force of our party is the most left-wing current of the world labor movement (Leninists), the split policy in our party does not and cannot have any justification from the point of view of Leninism. (A voice: "Is it possible for us to split in the party? Or not?"

He who does not understand this fundamental difference, goes against Leninism, breaks with Leninism.

That is why I think that only people who have gone mad and have lost the last remnants of Marxism can seriously say that the policy of our party, the policy of struggle on two fronts, is the policy of centrism.

Lenin always led a struggle on two fronts in our party against both the "Lefts" and the clearly Menshevik deviations. Look through Lenin's brochure "Left-wing Children's Illness" in Communism, "look through the history of our party, and you will understand that our party has grown and strengthened in the struggle against both deviations — with both the right and the left. The struggle against the otzovists and the "left" communists, on the one hand, the struggle against the openly opportunist bias before the October revolution, during the October revolution and after it, on the other, are the phases our party went through in its development. Everyone is aware of Lenin's words that we must wage a struggle both with open opportunism and with "left" doctrinaires.

Does this mean that Lenin was a centrist, that he led a policy of centrism? Clearly that does not mean.

What, then, are our right and "left" deviators?

As for the right deviation, this, of course, is not the same as the opportunism of the Social Democrats of the prewar period. The bias towards opportunism is not yet opportunism. We know how Lenin explained in his time the concept of bias. The deviation to the right is something that has not yet resulted in opportunism and that can be corrected. Therefore, it is impossible to identify the deviation to the right with complete opportunism.

As for the "left" deviation, it represents something directly opposite to what the extreme left in the Second International of the pre-war period, that is, the Bolsheviks, represented. The "Left"

deviationists are not only not left-wing quotes, they are essentially the same Right deviationists, with the difference, however, that they unconsciously cover their real nature with "left" phrases. It would be a crime against the party not to see the entire depth of the difference between the "left" deviationists and the genuine Leninists, the **only** leftists (without quotes) in our party. (A voice: "And the legalization of biases?") If an open struggle with biases is legalization, then it must be admitted that Lenin "legalized" them long ago.

These deviationists, both right and "left", are recruited among the most diverse elements of non-proletarian layers, elements reflecting the pressure of the petty-bourgeois element on the party and the decomposition of individual links of the party. Some come from other parties; people with Trotskyist tendencies in the party; fragments of bygone factions in the party; bureaucratic (and bureaucratic) party members in the state, economic, cooperative, trade union apparatus, merging with the clearly bourgeois elements of these apparatuses; well-to-do party members in our village organizations, merging with the kulaks, etc., etc., is a breeding ground for deviations from the Leninist line. It is clear that nothing genuinely Left and Lenin can perceive these elements. They can feed only openly opportunistic bias, or the so-called "left" bias,

That is why the struggle on two fronts is the only correct party policy.

Further. Is it correct to say in theses that the **main** method of dealing with the right bias should be a method of detailed ideological struggle? I think that is correct. It would be nice to recall the experience of the struggle against Trotskyism here. How did we start the fight about him? Maybe with organizational conclusions? Of course not! We started it with an ideological struggle. It was conducted from 1918 to 1925. Already in 1924, our party and the V Congress of the Comintern passed a resolution on Trotskyism as a petty-bourgeois deviation. However, Trotsky sat with us both in the Central Committee and in the Politburo. Is it a fact or not? Fact. Therefore, we "tolerated" Trotsky and the Trotskyists as part of the Central Committee. Why did we allow them to be in the leadership of the party? Because the Trotskyists at that time, despite the differences with the party, obeyed the decisions of the Central Committee and remained loyal. When did we begin to apply organizational conclusions on a large scale? Only after the Trotskyists organized a faction, created their factional center, turned their faction into a new party and began to call people to anti-Soviet demonstrations.

I think that we should go the same way in the struggle on the right bias. The right deviation cannot yet be regarded as something that has formed and crystallized, although it is intensified in the party. It is only processed and crystallized. Do the right-wing deviationists have a faction? I think not. Can we say that they do not obey the decisions of our party? I think that we still have no reason to blame them for this. Can it be argued that right-wing deviationists will necessarily organize into their own faction? I doubt it. Hence the conclusion: the main method of fighting the right deviation should be the method of a developed ideological struggle at this stage. This is all the more correct because among some members of our party there is an opposite tendency - to start a struggle with a rightist deviation not from an ideological struggle, but from organizational conclusions. They just say: give us the right kind of people 10 or 20, we will banish them in a flash and end this way with the right deviation. I think, comrades, that such moods are wrong and dangerous. It is precisely in order not to swim according to such sentiments, but to put the struggle with the right bias on the right track, which is why it is necessary to say clearly and

decisively that the main method of our struggle with the right bias is ideological struggle at this stage.

Does this mean that we exclude any organizational conclusions? No, it does not mean. But this, undoubtedly, means that organizational conclusions should play a subordinate role here, and if there are no facts of violation of party decisions by right-wing deviationists, then we should not throw them out of any leading organizations and institutions. (Voice: "And Moscow practice?")

I think that among the Moscow leading comrades we did not have the right. There was a wrong attitude towards right sentiments. Most likely it can be said that there was a reconciliation trend. But I cannot say that there was a right deviation in the Moscow Committee. (Voice: "Was there an organizational struggle?")

The organizational struggle was, although it occupied a subordinate place. It was because re-elections on the basis of self-criticism are taking place in Moscow and district assets have the right to remove their secretaries. (Laughter.) (Voice: "Have the secretaries been re-elected here?") No one has prohibited the re-election of secretaries. There is the June appeal of the Central Committee, where it is explicitly said that the development of self-criticism can turn into an empty sound, if the grass-roots organizations do not have the right to remove any secretary, any committee. What can you object to such an appeal? (Voice: "Before party conference?") Yes, at least before party conference.

I see the augur smile on the faces of some comrades. This is not good, comrades. I see that some of you have an irrepressible desire to quickly take pictures from posts of various spokesmen for the right deviation. But this is not a solution, dear comrades. Of course, it is easier to remove from posts than to lead a wide and meaningful campaign of explanatory campaign about the right deviation, about the right danger and about the fight against it. But the easiest cannot be regarded as the best. Take the trouble to organize a wide explanatory campaign against the right danger, work not to spare time for it, and then you will see that the wider and deeper the campaign, the worse for the right bias. That is why I think that the center of our struggle against the Right deviation should be an ideological struggle.

As for the Moscow Committee, I don't know what else can be added to what I said at the plenum of the MK and IWC of the CPSU (b) Uglanov in my closing remarks. He explicitly stated: "If you recall a little bit of history, remember how I fought Zinoviev in Leningrad in 1921, then the "massacre" was a bit bigger. Then we found ourselves victorious because we were right. "

It turns out that Uglanov was fighting now, just as he had fought against Zinoviev at the time. Against whom, in fact, has he fought lately? Apparently, against the policies of the Central Committee. Against whom else? On what basis could this struggle be fought? Obviously on the basis of conciliationism with a right bias.

Therefore, the theses rightly emphasize the need to fight against conciliationism about the deviations from the Leninist line, especially against conciliationism with a right-wing bias, as one of the next tasks of our party.

Finally, the last question. The theses state that we must especially emphasize for this time the need to combat the right deviation. What does it mean? This means that the right-wing danger is at the moment the main danger in our party. The struggle against the Trotskyist tendencies, and, moreover, a concentrated struggle, has been going on here for a dozen years. The result of this struggle is the rout of the main cadres of Trotskyism. It cannot be said that the struggle

against the openly opportunist bias was conducted just as intensively lately. And it was not conducted especially intensively because the right bias is still in the period of formation and crystallization, intensifying and growing due to the intensification of the petty-bourgeois element, which grew due to our grain procurement difficulties. Therefore, the main blow should be directed against the right slope.

In concluding my word, comrades, I would like to note one more fact that was not mentioned here and which, in my opinion, is of no small importance. We, members of the Politburo, have offered you our theses on check figures. In my speech, I defended these theses as absolutely correct. I am not talking about individual corrections that can be made to these theses. But that basically they are correct and provide us with the correct pursuit of the Leninist line, there can be no doubt about that. And now I must tell you that these theses have been adopted unanimously by us in the Politburo. I think this fact has some significance in view of those rumors that every now and then spread in our ranks by all sorts of ill-wishers, opponents and enemies of our party. I mean the rumors that, as if we, in the Politburo, have a right deviation, a "left" bias, conciliation and the devil knows what else. Let these theses serve as one more, one hundredth or one hundred first proof that we are all united in the Politburo.

I would like this plenum to unanimously adopt these theses as a basis. (Applause.)

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