

SOURCE D *Extract from Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922–1945 by Aristotle A Kallis, 2000. Aristotle A Kallis is Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at Lancaster University, UK.*

In August 1923, a car carrying a League of Nations' arbitration team on the Greek–Albanian border was ambushed in northern Greece ... As the incident had happened inside Greece's national territory, the Italian government held Athens responsible for the murder and issued a strong ultimatum, demanding a massive compensation ... After the occupation and bombardment of Corfu by the Italian air force the case was referred to international arbitration; not, however, to the League of Nations, but to the Conference of the Ambassadors. The reason for this decision was that the French and British governments preferred to resolve the crisis without resorting to collective security in accordance with the Covenant of the League ... The negotiations were long and difficult, disrupted by Mussolini's refusal to reconsider the amount of financial compensation demanded from the Greek government ... In the end, a compromise formula was agreed which enabled the Fascist regime to get away with aggression and receive the full compensation it had initially demanded in return for the immediate withdrawal of the Italian forces from Corfu.

[Extract from Aristotle A Kallis (2000). *Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922–1945*, Routledge: London and New York.]

SOURCE E *Extract from the article "The League of Nations and the Settlement of Disputes" by Lorna Lloyd, 1995. Lloyd is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Keele, UK.*

But Greece itself confused the issue by appealing initially to both the Conference of Ambassadors and the League and ... when the Italian representative questioned the right of the Council to deal with the dispute, Lord Cecil of Britain asked the interpreter to read aloud the articles of the Covenant about disputes between League members. In a tense and silent room this was a clever tactic. For without bringing any allegation against the Italian Government ... he showed the world the firm intention of the British Government to uphold the Covenant.

Although Mussolini publicly proclaimed the Corfu incident a victory and had the overwhelming majority of Italians behind him, he knew he had been defeated. He might not have minded earning the label of being an international bully, but he had intended to keep Corfu and all he received was his compensation ... The impact of the new League morality had made itself felt, and Mussolini had been unable to ignore the League. The other great powers did not turn their backs on their League obligations.

1. (a) What, according to Source B, was the decision of the Council of the League of Nations concerning the Åland Islands? *[3 marks]*
(b) What is the message conveyed by Source C? *[2 marks]*

 2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources D and E about the Corfu incident. *[6 marks]*

 3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source D for historians studying principles of collective security and early attempts at peacekeeping (1920–1925). *[6 marks]*

 4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the effectiveness of principles of collective security and early attempts at peacekeeping (1920–1925). *[8 marks]*
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