
Introduction

You have now completed your study of the main aspects and events of *The Move to Global War* – in relation to Japan's actions, and to those of Italy and Germany. In the previous chapters, you have had practice at answering some of the types of source-based questions you will have to deal with in Paper 1. In this chapter, you will gain experience of dealing with:

- the longer Paper 1 question, which requires you to use both sources and your own knowledge to write a mini-essay
- the essay questions you will meet in Paper 2.

Exam skills needed for IB History

This book is designed primarily to prepare both Standard and Higher Level students for the Paper 1 *The Move to Global War* topic (Prescribed Subject 3), by providing the necessary historical knowledge and understanding, as well as an awareness of the key historical debates and perspectives. However it will also help you prepare for Paper 2, by giving you the chance to practise writing essays. The skills you need for answering both Paper 1 and Paper 2 exam questions are explained in the following sections.

Paper 1 exam practice

Paper 1 skills

This section of the book is designed to give you the skills and understanding to tackle Paper 1 questions. These are based on the comprehension, critical analysis and evaluation of different types of historical sources as evidence, along with the use of appropriate historical contextual knowledge.

For example, you will need to test sources for value and limitations (i.e. their reliability and utility, especially in view of their origin, purpose and content) – a skill essential for historians. A range of sources has been provided, including extracts from official documents, tables of statistics, memoirs and speeches, as well as visual sources such as photographs and cartoons.

Exam Practice

In order to analyse and evaluate sources as historical evidence, you will need to ask the following **‘W’ questions** of historical sources:

- **Who** produced it? Were they in a position to know?
- **What** type of source is it? What is its nature – is it a primary or secondary source?
- **Where** and **when** was it produced? What was happening at the time?
- **Why** was it produced? Was its purpose to inform or to persuade? Is it an accurate attempt to record facts, or is it an example of propaganda?
- **Who** was the intended audience – decision-makers, or the general public?

You should then consider how the answers to these questions affect a source’s value.

The example below shows you how to find the information related to the ‘W’ questions. You will need this information in order to evaluate sources for their value and limitations.

Comments WHAT? (type of source)

Shidehara Kijuro WHO? (produced it)

1931 WHEN? (date/ time of production)

setting out his views WHY? (possible purpose)

Chinese diplomat Ch’en Yu-jen WHO? (intended audience)

SOURCE A

Chinese seem to think Manchuria is part of China but it used to be Russian. There is no doubt that if the situation had been left alone, Manchuria would soon have ceased to be under Ch’ing authority. The only reason the Manchu regime was able to hold this vast fertile region was a Japanese military presence. Since the Russo-Japanese War, Manchuria has enjoyed peace and prosperity unparalleled in any other Chinese area. Japanese are convinced that the development of the northeast region is at least partly due to our businesses and investment there.

Comments made by **Shidehara Kijuro**, in a meeting with the **Chinese diplomat Ch’en Yu-jen** in **1931**, **setting out his views** concerning Japanese influence in Manchuria. These comments were made a month before the Manchurian Incident; at the time, Shidehara was Japan’s foreign minister and did not support an expansionist foreign policy.

This approach will help you become familiar with interpreting, understanding, analysing and evaluating different types of historical sources. It will also aid you in synthesising critical analysis of sources with historical knowledge when constructing an explanation or analysis of some aspect or development of the past. Remember – for Paper 1, as for Paper 2, you need to acquire, select and deploy relevant historical knowledge to explain causes and consequences, continuity and change. You also need to develop and show (where relevant) an awareness of historical debates, and different perspectives and interpretations.

Paper 1 contains four types of question:

- 1 Comprehension/understanding of a source (2 or 3 marks)
- 2 Assessing the value and limitations of a source (4 marks)

- 3 Cross-referencing/comparing or contrasting two sources (6 marks)
 4 Using and evaluating sources and knowledge to reach a judgement (9 marks)

Comprehension/understanding of a source

Comprehension questions require you to understand a source and either extract two or three relevant points that relate to the particular question, or make one or two comments about the message of a source.

Examiner's tips

Step 1: Read the source and highlight/underline key points.

Step 2: Write a concise answer. Just a couple of brief sentences are needed, giving the information necessary to show that you have understood the message of the source – but make sure you make three clear points for a 3 mark question and two clear points for a 2 mark question. If relevant, also try to make some brief overall comment about the source. Make it as easy as possible for the examiner to give you the marks by clearly distinguishing between the points.

Common mistakes

Make sure you don't comment on the wrong source! (Mistakes like this are made every year. Remember – every mark is important for your final grade.)

Simplified mark scheme

For each item of relevant/correct information identified, award 1 mark – up to a maximum of 2 or 3 marks.

Assessing the value and limitations of a source

Value and limitations (utility/reliability) questions require you to assess **one** source over a range of possible issues/aspects – and to comment on its value to historians studying a particular event or period of history.

Examiner's tips

The main areas you need to consider in relation to the source and the information / view it provides are:

- **origin, purpose** and **content**
- value and limitations.

These areas need to be linked in your answer, showing how the value and limitations of the source to historians relate to the source's origin, purpose and content

For example, a source might be useful because it is primary – the event depicted was witnessed by the person producing it. But was the person in a position to know? Is the view an untypical view of the event? What is its nature? Is it a private diary entry

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

Timing: For a 3 mark question you ought not to spend more than about 7 minutes, and for a 2 mark question no more than about 5 minutes. Don't spend too long on these questions or you will run out of time!

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

Examples of a comprehension question can be found at the end of Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.

origin: The 'who, what, when and where?' questions

purpose: This means 'reasons, what the writer/creator was trying to achieve, who the intended audience was'

content: This is the information or explanation(s) provided by the source

Remember: a source doesn't have to be primary to be useful. Remember, too, that content isn't the only aspect to have possible value. The context, the person who produced it, and so on, can be important in offering an insight.

Exam Practice

(therefore possibly more likely to be true), or is it a speech or piece of propaganda intended to persuade? The value of a source may be limited by some aspects, but that doesn't mean it has no value at all. For example, it may be valuable as evidence of the types of propaganda put out at the time. Similarly, a secondary – or even a tertiary – source can have more value than some primary sources: for instance, because the author might be writing at a time when new evidence has become available.

Step 1: Read the source and highlight/underline key points.

Step 2: Then draw a rough chart or spider diagram to show the origin/purpose/content of the source, and how it links to that source's value/limitation.

Step 3: Write your answer, remembering to deal with **all** the aspects required: **origin, purpose, content, value and limitations**. To do this, you will need to make **explicit** links between a source's origin/purpose/content **and** its value/limitations to an historian.

Common mistakes

- Don't just comment on content and ignore the nature, origin and purpose of the source.
- Don't say 'a source is/ isn't useful because it's primary/ secondary'.

Simplified mark scheme

Band		Marks
1	Explicit/ developed consideration of BOTH origin, purpose and content AND value and limitations.	3–4
2	Limited consideration/ comments on origin, purpose and content AND value and limitations. OR more developed comments on EITHER origin, purpose and content OR value and limitations.	0–2

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

Examples of value and limitations questions can be found at the end of Chapters 3 and 6.

Cross-referencing/comparing or contrasting two sources

Cross-referencing questions require you to compare **and** contrast the information/content/nature of **two** sources, relating to a particular issue.

Examiner's tips

For cross-referencing questions, you need to provide an integrated comparison, rather than dealing with each source separately.

Step 1: Read the sources and highlight/underline key points.

Step 2: Draw a rough chart or diagram to show the **similarities** and the **differences** between the two sources. That way, you should ensure you address both elements of the question.

Step 3: Write your answer, ensuring that you write an integrated comparison.

For example, you should comment on how the two sources deal with one aspect, then compare and contrast the sources on another aspect. Avoid simply describing/paraphrasing each source in turn – you need to make **clear and explicit** comparisons and contrasts, using precise details from the sources.

Common mistakes

- Don't just comment on **one** of the sources! (Such an oversight happens every year – and will lose you 4 of the 6 marks available.)
- Make sure you comment on the sources identified in the question – don't select one (or two) incorrect sources!
- Be careful to make **explicit** comparisons – do not fall into the trap of writing about the two sources separately and leaving the similarities/differences implicit.

Simplified mark scheme

Band		Marks
1	Both sources linked , with detailed references to BOTH sources, identifying both similarities and differences .	6
2	Both sources linked , with detailed references to BOTH sources, identifying either similarities or differences .	4–5
3	Comments on both sources , but treats each one separately.	3
4	Discusses/ comments on just one source .	0–2

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

Examples of a cross-referencing question can be found at the end of Chapters 4 and 7.

Using and evaluating sources and knowledge to reach a judgement

The fourth type of Paper 1 question is a judgement question. Judgement questions are a synthesis of source evaluation and own knowledge.

Examiner's tips

- This fourth type of Paper 1 question requires you to produce a mini-essay – with a clear/relevant argument – to address the question/statement given in the question. You should try to develop and present an argument and/or come to a balanced judgement by analysing and using these **four** sources **and** your own knowledge.
- Before you write your answer to this kind of question, you may find it useful to draw a rough chart to note what the sources show in relation to the question. This will also make sure you refer to all or at least most of the sources. Note, however, that some sources may hint at more than one factor/result. When using your own knowledge, make sure it is relevant to the question.

Exam Practice

- Look carefully at the simplified mark scheme – this will help you focus on what you need to do to reach the top bands and so score the higher marks.

Common mistakes

- Don't just deal with sources **or** your own knowledge! Every year, some candidates (even good ones) do this, and so limit themselves to – at best – only 5 out of the 9 marks available.

Simplified mark scheme

Band		Marks
1	Consistently focused on the question. Developed and balanced analysis , with precise use of BOTH sources AND relevant/accurate own knowledge. Sources and own knowledge are used consistently and effectively together, to support argument/judgement.	8–9
2	Mostly focused on the question. Developed analysis, with relevant use of BOTH sources AND some detailed own knowledge. But sources and own knowledge not always combined to support analysis/judgement.	6–7
3	Some focus on the question. Some analysis , using some of the sources OR some relevant/accurate own knowledge.	4–5
4	No/limited focus on the question. Limited/ generalised comments on sources AND/ OR some limited/inaccurate/irrelevant own knowledge.	0–3

Student answers


The student answers below have brief examiner's comments in the margins, as well as a longer overall comment at the end. Those parts of the answers which make use of the sources are highlighted in purple. Those parts that deploy relevant own knowledge are highlighted in red. In this way, you should find it easier to follow why particular bands and marks were – or were not – awarded.

Question 1

Using Sources A, B, C, and D, **and** your own knowledge, evaluate the reasons for Japan's expansionist foreign policy after 1933. [9 marks]

SOURCE A

Figure 9.1



SOURCE B

Japan may be regarded, along with Germany and Italy, as one of the three major dissatisfied 'have-not' powers of the world. It was in Italian Fascist intellectual circles that the idea first found expression that there could just as logically be a 'class struggle' between rich and poor nations as between the 'bourgeoisie' and the 'proletariat' in a single nation. German National Socialist [Nazi] leaders have displayed an increasing tendency to attribute their countries economic difficulties largely to the lack of colonial sources of essential raw materials. Japan sees itself confronted with a similar problem, despite the acquisition of Manchukuo. So the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Amau, recently remarked:

'Unfortunately the territories which now feed Japan's population are too small. We are advised to practice birth control, but this advice comes too late, since the population of the Japanese Empire is already about 100,000,000. Japanese work harder and longer than people in Western countries; their opportunities in life are more restricted. Why? We need more territory and must cultivate more resources if we are to nourish our population.'

Extract from Chamberlain, W. H. 1938. *Japan over Asia*. Quoted in Overy, R. J. 1994. *The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939*. Harlow. Longman. p. 124.

SOURCE C

Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3. Japan, Germany, and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if one of the Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European War or in the Japanese-Chinese conflict.

The first three articles of the Tripartite Pact of September 1940.

From: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/triparti.asp>

SOURCE D

1. Our Empire is determined to follow a policy that will result in the establishment of the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and will thereby contribute to world peace....
2. Our Empire will continue its efforts to effect a settlement of the China Incident [Japan's invasion of China] and will seek to establish a solid basis for the security and preservation of the nation. This will involve steps to advance south.
3. Our Empire is determined to remove all obstacles in order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.

In order to achieve the above objectives, preparations for war with Great Britain and the United States will be made.... In carrying out the plans outlined above, our Empire will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with Great Britain and the United States.

Extract from the minutes of the Japanese government's Imperial Conference, held in Tokyo on 2 July 1941. Quoted in Overy, R. J. 1987. *The Origins of the Second World War*. London. Longman. p. 114.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

This is a good, well-focused, start, with a clear argument – Source A is examined, with a clear link to the question, along with some relevant own knowledge. Although not specifically identifying individual sources, the candidate has flagged up their intention to use the other three sources.

Student answer

There are a number of reasons why Japan pursued an expansionist foreign policy after 1933, and these are all shown by the four sources. One reason is shown by Source A, which shows a weak China being 'supported' by Japan. The cartoon is about the announcement by Japan in 1933 about its 'Eastern Monroe Doctrine'. The poster talks of 'Asia for the Asiatics'. Japan – which had completed its occupation of Manchuria in 1932, and had already taken over the Chinese province of Rehe (Jehol) – saw its version of the Monroe Doctrine as a way of expanding its own territory and influence in China and elsewhere in Asia. In particular, China – distracted by civil war between the Nationalist and the Communists – presented an easy target for Japanese expansion, and thus an important reason for making such expansion seem possible. After several encroachments and 'incidents', Japan finally invaded China in 1937, thus beginning the Second Sino-Soviet War.

This aim of expanding Japanese territory is also shown by the other three sources. Source B, which was written in 1938, refers to Japan as a 'have-not' power which saw its 'economic difficulties' being the result of its 'lack of colonial sources of essential raw materials'. In addition, Source B contains comments made by a spokesperson of Japan's Foreign Ministry, who stated that Japan needs 'more territory'. Japan's nationalists and many of its military leaders wanted to expand the Japanese empire as a way of overcoming the economic problems caused by the Great Depression. By 1931, over half of Japan's factories had closed, and exports had also dropped by half. Japan's important silk industry was hit particularly badly.

Source C – which shows some of the main articles of the Tripartite Pact of September 1940 – is closely linked to Sources A, B and D, as it comments on Japan's aim of 'establishing a new order in Greater East Asia' (this idea is also specifically mentioned in Source D). This was similar to the ideas of the earlier Eastern Monroe Doctrine, and would help achieve the extra territory Japan felt it needed after the Depression. By 1940, imperial Japan had moved close to two other expansionist powers – Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. By joining with them, Japan felt more able to risk war with Britain and the US, as the Tripartite Pact included promises to help each other if they were 'attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European War or in the Japanese-Chinese conflict'. As Britain was already at war with Germany and Italy, this was clearly aimed at the US – the power most likely to object to further Japanese expansion in Asia and the Pacific as it too had its own important interests in those areas.

Finally, Source D – an extract from the Minutes of Japan's Imperial Conference of July 1941 – also relates to the aim of expanding Japan's territory. Point 2 actually talks about Japan's intention to 'advance south', and even mentions that the Japanese Empire was prepared to get 'involved in a war with Great Britain and the United States' to achieve this territorial expansion. The signing of the Tripartite Pact (as shown in Source C) the year before would have given Japan greater confidence to risk such a war. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which Japan first announced in 1940, was meant to be a loose alliance between Japan and other nations in Asia to overcome the control of European colonial powers such as Britain, France and the Netherlands which had extensive colonies in the region. However, in practice, it was essentially a way of Japan extending its own empire.

So, in conclusion, these four sources touch on all the main reasons why Japan followed an expansionist foreign policy after 1933.

Overall examiner's comments

There is a clear argument, and good use of the sources, with clear references to them. However, although there is a mixture of some precise and general own knowledge, which is mainly integrated with comments on the sources, there are some omissions. For instance, own knowledge could have been used to give other reasons not touched on by the sources – such as the impact of US sanctions imposed following Japan's aggression in China, or the problem of overpopulation (which is actually mentioned in Source B). Additionally, something could have been said about the growing control of Japan's military leaders over civilian governments. Also, there is no real attempt to assess the relative importance of these factors. Hence, this answer fails to get into Band 1 – but this is a reasonably sound Band 2 answer and so probably scores 6 marks out of the 9 available.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

Sources B and C are clearly referred to and used, showing good understanding, and there is some own knowledge about how the Great Depression's impact on Japan led to increased pressure for expansion. In addition, Sources B, C, D and A are explicitly linked, and there are comments about why the Tripartite Pact was seen as useful by Japan's expansionists.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

As before, Source D is clearly used, and is linked to Source C. There is also some relevant own knowledge. However, the student has not really made an attempt to evaluate the relative importance of the reasons mentioned in the sources. Nor are any other reasons – not mentioned by the sources – examined.

Exam Practice

Activity

Look again at the all sources, the simplified mark scheme, and the student answer above. Now try to write a few paragraphs to push the answer up into Band 1, and so obtain the full 9 marks. As well as using all/most of the sources, and some precise own knowledge, try to integrate the sources with your own knowledge, rather than dealing with sources and own knowledge separately. And don't lose sight of the need to use the sources and your own knowledge to explain which reason you think was most important.

Question 2

'Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was the most important reason for the collapse of collective security in the period 1929–39.' Using Sources A, B, C, and D, **and** your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with this statement? [9 marks]


SOURCE A

In February 1933, the League of Nations declared that the State of Manchukuo could not be recognised. Although no sanctions were imposed upon Japan, nor any other action taken, Japan, on March 27, 1933, withdrew from the League of Nations. Germany and Japan had been on opposite sides in the [First World] war; they now looked upon each other in a different mood. The moral authority of the League was shown to be devoid of any physical support at a time when its activity and strength were most needed.

Churchill, W. 1948. *The Gathering Storm*. London. Cassell and Co. p. 80.

SOURCE B

Figure 9.2



SOURCE C

The Spanish Civil War, non-intervention and intervention had an impact on the subsequent fortunes of the world powers. Non-intervention failed to appease the dictators. Intervention hardly benefited Italy and the Soviet Union. Only Germany really gained an advantage, both economically and militarily, from its participation in the Spanish war. Above all, the Civil War can be seen as a rehearsal for, or at least a prelude to, the Second World War... The weaknesses of the democracies were neatly exposed by their refusal to intervene in Spain. According to Mary Habeck, the Spanish war prevented Franco-British unity against the dictators in that it distracted attention from far greater dangers...

Britain's policy of compromise, rather than calming the international situation, only heightened tension between the European powers. The British government failed to understand that Spain was another arena where Germany and Italy were testing how far their aggressive stance could be taken... The Civil War also alienated the Soviet Union from the West. Receiving no response to appeals for collective security, Stalin became increasingly convinced that appeasement would channel Hitler's attention towards the East.

Durgan, A. 2007. *The Spanish Civil War*. Basingstoke, UK. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 74–6.

SOURCE D

In 1936 when Hitler ordered German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland there was little international protest... Few in Germany bothered to read *Mein Kampf* to discover Hitler's real motives and his obsession with territorial expansion. Nazi propaganda portrayed Hitler as a man of peace pursuing justifiable revisions of the humiliating Versailles Treaty.

The treaty that led to the Rome-Berlin Axis in November 1936 had changed the balance of power in Europe, and Austria, in particular, was left isolated as a result. Previously, Austria had depended on an alliance with Britain, France and Italy to secure her independence in the face of German demands. With Italy now on Germany's side, the balance of power in central Europe had shifted dramatically. As a result of the Rome-Berlin Axis, Hitler was now in a stronger position... The German invasion of Austria [on 12 March 1938] was Hitler's first move outside German territory in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles.... The Anschluss of Austria not only revealed the extent of Hitler's imperial ambitions, it also dealt a strategic blow at Czechoslovakia which could now be attacked from the south as well as from the west and north.

Welch, D. 1998. *Hitler*. London. UCL Press. pp. 58–9.

Student answer

There were several reasons for the collapse of collective security during the 1930s. These include the impact of the Great Depression, Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the failure of the Disarmament Conference in 1934, Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935,

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

This is a good introduction, showing a clear understanding of the topic and the factors relevant to the question.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

There is good use of relevant own knowledge, some of which is precise, and the candidate is clearly aware of the need to make a judgement about which reason was most important. Although, so far, there has been no use of – or even reference to – any of the sources, this is OK as the candidate has begun with a factor not dealt with by any of the sources.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

There is more good use of relevant and mostly-precise own knowledge, linked to the question. However, although there are very brief references to two sources, these sources have not been used, nor has their content been analysed/evaluated. This is a serious weakness in a question that requires both own knowledge AND sources to be used.

Germany's re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 and its Anschluss with Austria in 1938. Also important was the Munich Conference in 1938, the US policy of isolation, and the failure of Britain to form an anti-Nazi alliance with the Soviet Union. The four sources mention several of these, but not all of them.

The most important reason for the collapse of collective security was the economic and political impact of the Great Depression – and none of the sources mentions this. The Depression began as a result of the Wall Street Crash in the US and had important economic and political impacts across the world. Because of the resulting poverty and unemployment in Germany, Hitler and the Nazis were able to come to power in Germany in 1933. This was crucial as Hitler's foreign policy aims – such as grabbing land in the east for Lebensraum ('living space'), and overturning aspects of the peace treaties of 1919–20 – were bound to lead to conflicts in Europe. The Depression also impacted on Japan, and played a large part in the emergence of a militaristic and expansionist foreign policy there. However, because the Depression caused serious economic problems, many of the democratic countries – including Britain – adopted austerity policies by cutting government expenditure. This included spending on armed forces. This meant they felt unable to resist the aggressive foreign policies adopted by imperial Japan and by the fascist dictatorships of Italy and Germany. In addition, many countries – including the US – were not prepared to impose economic sanctions on aggressor countries, as they didn't want to lose any trade. Amongst other things, this pursuit of self-interest undermined the ability of the members of the League of Nations to work effectively together, in the way they had done before 1929 and the Depression. In particular, France felt increasingly abandoned by Britain when it came to opposing Hitler's actions in the period 1935–38.

Although Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was important in showing how an aggressor nation could ignore the League, Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 (Source A) was probably more important. This is because it led to the break-up of the Stresa Front between Britain, France and Italy. This had been formed in 1935, after these three countries had joined together to oppose Hitler's attempt in 1934 to push through Anschluss with Austria. This was proof that collective security could work. However, these three countries – which were the main members of the League of Nations – then fell out over the Abyssinian crisis. Although Britain and France had tried, by the Hoare-Laval Pact, to give Mussolini most of Abyssinia, this had caused public outcry and was dropped. Even though the sanctions that Britain and France had then got the League to impose on Italy were very limited, they were enough to anger Mussolini. More importantly, Hitler moved quickly to get Italy on his side. The following year, they formed the Rome-Berlin Axis (Source D) – once Japan joined in 1937, there were three Axis powers, all of which were determined to pursue expansionist foreign policies. Abyssinia was also important for the collapse of collective security because – like with Manchuria – it showed aggressors that Britain and France were not prepared to take strong action to prevent conflict.

This impression was confirmed in many ways in the years after 1936. For instance, despite setting up a Non-Intervention Committee when civil war broke out in Spain (Source C), Britain and France did nothing when both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany sent weapons and troops to aid the right-wing rebels. They maintained this line even when British and French merchant ships were attacked by Axis submarines and planes. This lack of action to protect a democratically-elected government from fascist aggression

confirmed Hitler's belief that, whatever he did, there would be no serious practical opposition from the democracies.

Although Hitler had walked out of the Disarmament Conference (Source B) in 1933, and had begun to re-arm, it was his foreign policy actions from 1936 onwards that did more to further undermine collective security than the actual collapse of the Disarmament Conference. These included the re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 and the Anschluss with Austria in 1938 (Source D). Though more important than Hitler's actions was the reaction – or, rather, the lack of reaction – of Britain and France to these breaches of the Treaty of Versailles. The successful Anschluss with Austria shows how important Abyssinia and the break-up of the Stresa Front was: in 1934, Italy had joined with Britain and France to block Hitler's first attempt in 1934. This time, with Italy joined to Nazi Germany in the Rome-Berlin Axis, Austria was taken without a shot being fired.

All this encouraged Hitler to go further – his first target was Czechoslovakia. At first, he demanded the Sudetenland: unlike the Rhineland and Anschluss with Austria, this had nothing to do with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles as, previously, this land had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, not of Germany. As on previous occasions, Britain and France decided to let Hitler take possession of this land at the Munich Conference in September 1938. This Conference was important in undermining collective security because, as well as convincing Hitler and Mussolini that Britain and France would never oppose their actions, it began to convince the Soviet Union that, if anything, Britain and France were in effect giving Hitler a free hand to expand eastwards. This was significant as, for some time, the Soviet Union (which had been a member of the League since 1934) had been suggesting a joint pact to oppose Nazi Germany's growing aggression. By August 1939, Stalin had instead made a Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany to buy time for building up Soviet defences.

Finally, another important reason for the collapse of collective security by 1939 was how USA and the Soviet Union reacted to the aggressive foreign policies of Imperial Japan and the fascist dictators in Europe. The US which, certainly since the end of the First World War, had become the most powerful nation in the world – both economically and militarily – had refused to join the League of Nations. Instead, it mainly followed a policy of isolation: at least as far as Europe was concerned. In fact, during most of the 1930s, some of its leading politicians and statesmen – such as Joseph Kennedy, the US ambassador to Britain – were actually opposed to taking action against Hitler, as his fierce anti-communism made him seem a useful block against the Soviet Union. In addition, while the Soviet Union had, up until the Munich Conference in 1938, been prepared to work with Britain and France to block Hitler's growing aggression in Europe, it eventually gave up on this. Instead, Stalin replaced Litvinov (who had favoured an alliance with Britain and France) with Molotov, and then tried to stay out of any possible war by signing the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939.

Although all these factors were important reasons for the collapse of collective security, I think the Abyssinian crisis was the most important one as it was this which broke up the Stresa Front and pushed Fascist Italy into the arms of Nazi Germany. Given that Britain would not join with the Soviet Union, collective security was effectively mortally wounded in 1935: it just took a few more years to die.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

The own knowledge approach has, unfortunately, been continued. Although the own knowledge is relevant, mostly precise and pinned to the question, yet again there are only the very briefest references to two sources.

Exam Practice

Overall examiner's comments

There is good and precise own knowledge, which is focused on the question. In addition, there is a clear attempt to come to a balanced judgement about relative importance. However, there are only minimal references to – **and no real use of** – the sources. Hence, as Paper 1 is mainly a source-based exam, the candidate has only done enough to be awarded the top of Band 3 – so gaining only 5 marks of the 9 available.

Activity

Look again at all the sources, the simplified mark scheme, and the student answer above. Now try to write your own answer to this question – and see if you can analyse the sources in relation to the question, and integrate this with own knowledge. You can, of course, decide that another reason is more important than Abyssinia.

Question 3

'Fear and hatred of communism was the main reason why Britain preferred appeasing Nazi Germany rather than forming an alliance with the Soviet Union to oppose Hitler's aggressive foreign policy in the period 1937–39.' Using the sources *and* your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with this statement?

[9 marks]

SOURCE A

It is our opinion that no pressure that Great Britain and France can bring to bear, either by sea, on land, or in the air, could prevent Germany from overrunning Bohemia and from inflicting a decisive defeat on Czechoslovakia. The restoration of Czechoslovakia's lost integrity could only be achieved by the defeat of Germany and as the outcome, which from the outset must assume the character of an unlimited war.

The intervention of Italy and/ or Japan on the side of Germany would create a situation which the Chiefs of Staff in the '*Mediterranean and Middle East Appreciation*' described in the following language: 'Moreover, war against Japan, Germany and Italy simultaneously in 1938 is a commitment which neither the present nor the projected strength of our defence forces is designed to meet, even if we were in alliance with France and Russia, and which would, therefore, place a dangerous strain on the resources of the [British] Empire ...'

Extracts from Chiefs of Staff Report: 'Appreciation of the Situation in the Event of War against Germany', 14 September 1938. Quoted in Dickenson, M. 2009. *Historical Controversies and Historical Significance*. Harlow. Heinemann. p. 71.

SOURCE B

When Neville Chamberlain became British Prime Minister in May 1937 he gave a new impetus to appeasement. For Chamberlain, appeasement meant taking the initiative and showing Hitler that 'reasonable' claims could be achieved by negotiation and not force. Chamberlain and Daladier, the new French Prime Minister, feared that the Czech crisis could precipitate a wider conflict and decided that Czechoslovakia was simply not worth a European war. The Czech President, Benes, was urged therefore to make concessions to the Sudeten Germans. Chamberlain had three meetings with Hitler: at Berchtesgaden on 15 September, at Bad Godesberg on 22–23 September, and at Munich on 29–30 September. At the first meeting, Hitler stated his intention to annex the Sudetenland on the principle of self-determination. At Bad Godesberg he insisted on immediate German occupation, and finally at Munich he was persuaded to accept a phased occupation with an international commission to arbitrate over disputed boundaries ... On 29 September 1938, an international conference was held at Munich. The participants were Germany, Italy, Britain and France. Conspicuous by their absence were Czechoslovakia, whose fate was to be decided, and the Soviet Union, which was not invited.

Welch, D. 1998. *Hitler*. London. UCL Press. pp. 59–60.

SOURCE C

Figure 9.3



SOURCE D

I must confess to a most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted to. And I distrust her motives which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with getting everyone by the ears. Moreover, she is both hated and suspected by the smaller states, notably, Poland, Rumania and Finland.

An extract from Chamberlain's diary entry for 26 March 1939. Quoted in Feiling, K. 1946. *The Life of Neville Chamberlain*. London. Macmillan. p. 403.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

This is a brief – but good – introduction, which shows a clear understanding of the topic and the demands of the question.

Student answer

These sources only partly support the view that British fear and hatred of communism was the main reason appeasement was pursued rather than an anti-Nazi alliance with the Soviet Union. There were several other reasons behind the policy of appeasement, and the sources show some of these – but not all of them.

Fear and hatred of communism was certainly an important factor behind the refusal to make common cause with the Soviet Union to stop Nazi Germany's expansionist foreign policy. Source D shows this most clearly – while Sources B and C also seem to confirm this view. Source D – which, because it is from Chamberlain's private diary (and therefore not meant for immediate publication) – seems a reliable and thus useful indication of attitudes to the Soviet Union. This source is also useful because appeasement is mainly associated with Chamberlain who, as Source B states, became British prime minister in 1937. This source shows he had a 'most profound mistrust of Russia'; the diary entry then goes on to show that he distrusted Soviet 'motives which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty'.

As well as 'liberty' meaning a democratic multi-party system, Chamberlain – as a Conservative – would also have meant a capitalist economy. Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in November 1917, the main countries of Europe – and the US and Japan – had been opposed to the Soviet Union. In fact, immediately after the revolution, these states – including Britain – had sent armed forces to intervene on the side of the Whites in the Russian Civil War. When, unexpectedly, the Reds won the civil war, these capitalist states had imposed economic blockades and sanctions against the Soviet Union in the hope – as expressed by Churchill (a Conservative politician) – that Bolshevism could be 'strangled in its cradle'. When the Great Depression hit in the 1930s, the mass unemployment and poverty saw a growth in support for Communist Parties across Europe. This only increased long-standing fears of communism amongst conservative politicians and capitalist bankers and industrialists.

The significance of anti-communism as an important factor behind the adoption of appeasement, rather than allying with the Soviet Union, is something post-revisionist historians have stressed. Even Churchill – who was fiercely anti-communist – criticised the continuance of appeasement and, instead, advocated an alliance with the USSR. Post-revisionist historians have pointed out that Chamberlain ignored intelligence warnings about Hitler's intentions and often deliberately misled public opinion. According to such historians as Adamthwaite, this was because of the anti-communist prejudices of the British ruling class – something that can be seen as confirming the view expressed in the Soviet cartoon (Source C).

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

There is good and balanced use – including brief evaluative comments on value/usefulness – of Source D, along with links to Sources B and C. There is also relevant own knowledge, which is mostly precise, focused on the question, and integrated in the answer – along with some awareness of historical debate.

As well as Source D indicating that fear of communism was a factor, both Sources C and B can be read as confirming this. Source C shows Britain and France directing a clearly-aggressive Nazi Germany towards the Soviet Union. This was published after the Munich Conference, and reflects the growing belief in the USSR that Britain and France were not just opposed to an alliance with Stalin's Russia, but were actively hoping that Hitler would attack the USSR, and so destroy the only non-capitalist country in the world. *This was a genuine Soviet fear – especially given the context of the Great Depression which had had such a negative impact on the economies of capitalist states. This was why the Soviet Union was worried – as well as angry – that they were not invited to the Munich Conference. Especially given the fact that they had promised military aid to Czechoslovakia to prevent Nazi Germany taking the Sudetenland.*

Source B, which is an extract from a history book written in 1998, confirms that the Soviet Union 'was not invited' to the Munich Conference. However, Source B does not offer an explanation of why the Soviet Union was not invited. In fact, one reason – which is touched on by Source D – was that the Soviet Union was 'both hated and suspected by the smaller states, notably, Poland, Rumania and Finland' (Source D). Poland, in particular, hated the Soviet Union. *As well as having had an authoritarian conservative and anti-communist government for some time, Poland was afraid that, if it allowed the Red Army to cross their territory in order to help Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union might then attempt to take back the land Poland had taken from Soviet Russia as a result of the 1920–21 Russo-Polish War.*

Source D also gives another reason why Britain was reluctant to form an alliance with the Soviet Union. In his diary, Chamberlain states that he did not believe in the Soviet Union's 'ability to maintain an effective offensive'. This was written in 1939, after the *Great Purge and Terror* had been taking place in Stalin's USSR. These had begun in 1936 – though the first victims were leading members of the Communist Party, from May 1937, they had also been directed at important officers of the Red Army and the Soviet Air Force. *The Great Terror then spread to the lower ranks – by the end of 1938, almost 50% of the entire officer corps had been either executed, imprisoned or sacked. Consequently, many analysts believed the Red Army had been seriously weakened. This would be confirmed later on in 1939, when Soviet forces performed badly in the 'Winter War' against Finland. This factor is perhaps why, in Source A, the Chief of Staff Report says that 'even if we were in alliance with France and Russia' Britain could not cope with a war against the three Axis powers. Significantly, this source is dated 14 September 1938 – just two weeks before the Munich Conference at which Britain and France 'gave' Hitler the Sudetenland.*

However, as well as reasons connected to attitudes to the Soviet Union, there are also other reasons why appeasement was followed. Source B shows one of these: which was to avoid war. According to Source B, Chamberlain saw appeasement as a way of 'showing Hitler that "reasonable" claims could be achieved by negotiation and not force'. As well as the advice he had received from the British military (Source A), that Britain was not militarily-ready to fight a major war, Chamberlain – like many Europeans – was very reluctant to risk another war. In fact, Source B also states that France thought 'Czechoslovakia was simply not worth a European war.'

In fact, according to opinion polls, during much of the 1930s, most Britons were against re-armament and, instead, in favour of disarmament. A League of Nations opinion poll, found 90% of Britons thinking like this. So it can be argued that appeasement was something the public

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

There is clear use and assessment of Sources B and C, which is also linked to Sources A and D. In addition, there is good use of relevant own knowledge, which is mostly precise, and focused on the question. The candidate also identifies another reason.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

The candidate offers two more possible reasons, with good synthesis of sources and some precise own knowledge.

Exam Practice

wanted. Although, after Munich, there was a rapid shift in public attitudes – yet Chamberlain continued with appeasement. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that, even after the declaration of war in September 1939, he was still prepared to do a deal with Hitler. This could be interpreted as being the result of anti-communism.

Although there are several reasons why an alliance with the Soviet Union was rejected, I believe the main one was fear and hatred of communism. Many of the upper classes in Britain and elsewhere even had a slight admiration of the fascist dictators precisely because of their fierce anti-communism.

Overall examiner's comments

There is good and clear use of sources throughout, and constant integration of precise own knowledge to both explain and add to the sources. In addition, there is also some awareness of historical debate. The overall result is a sound analytical/evaluative explanation, focused clearly on the question, and with a clear and supported judgement. The candidate has done more than enough to be awarded Band 1 and the full 9 marks.

Activity

Look again at the all sources, the simplified mark scheme, and the student answer above. Now try to write your own answer to this question – and see if you can make different points with the sources, and use different/additional own knowledge, to produce an answer that offers an alternative judgement.

Paper 2 exam practice

Paper 2 skills and questions

For Paper 2, you have to answer **two** essay questions – chosen from two **different** topics from the 12 options offered. Very often, you will be asked to comment on two states from two different IB regions of the world. Although each question has a specific mark scheme, you can get a good general idea of what examiners are looking for in order to be able to put answers into the higher bands from the general 'generic' mark scheme. In particular, you will need to acquire reasonably precise historical knowledge in order to address issues such as cause and effect, or change and continuity, and to learn how to explain historical developments in a clear, coherent, well-supported and relevant way. You will also need to understand and be able to refer to aspects relating to historical debates, perspectives and interpretations.

Make sure you read the questions carefully, and select your questions wisely. It is important to produce a rough essay plan for each of your essays before you start to write an answer, and you may find it helpful to plan both your essays before you begin to write. That way, you will soon know whether you have enough own knowledge to answer them adequately.

Remember, too, to keep your answers relevant and focused on the question. For example, don't go outside the dates mentioned in the question, or answer on individuals/

states different from the ones identified in the question. Don't just describe the events or developments – sometimes, students just focus on one key word or individual, and then write down all they know about it. Instead, select your own knowledge carefully, and pin the relevant information to the key features raised by the question. Also, if the question asks for 'causes/reasons' and 'consequences/results', or two different countries/leaders, make sure you deal with **all** the parts of the question. Otherwise, you will limit yourself to half marks at best.

Examiner's tips

For Paper 2 answers, examiners are looking for clear/precise analysis, and a balanced argument, linked to the question, with the use of good, precise and relevant own knowledge. In order to obtain the highest marks, you should be able to refer, where appropriate, to historical debate and/or different historical perspectives, interpretations, or historians' knowledge, making sure it is both relevant to the question AND integrated into your answer.

Common mistakes

- When answering Paper 2 questions, try to avoid simply describing what happened. A detailed narrative, with no explicit attempts to link the knowledge to the question, will only get you half marks at most.
- If the question asks you to select examples from **two** different regions, make sure you don't choose two states from the same region. Every year, some candidates do this, and so limit themselves to – at best – only 8 out of the 15 marks available for each question.

Simplified mark scheme

Band		Marks
1	Consistently clear focus on the question, with all main aspects addressed . Answer is fully analytical and well-structured/organised . There is sound understanding of historical concepts. The answer also integrates evaluation of different historical debates/perspectives, and reaches a clear/consistent judgement/conclusion .	13–15
2	Clear understanding of the question, and most of its main aspects are addressed . Answer is mostly well-structured and developed , with supporting own knowledge mostly relevant/accurate . Answer is mainly analytical , with attempts at a consistent conclusion ; and shows some understanding of historical concepts and debates/perspectives .	10–12

continued

Band		Marks
3	Demands of the question are understood – but some aspects not fully developed/ addressed. Relevant/accurate supporting own knowledge, but attempts at analysis are limited/inconsistent.	7–9
4	Some understanding of the question. Some relevant own knowledge, with some factors identified – but with limited explanation . Some attempts at analysis, but answer is mainly description/narrative .	4–6
5	Limited understanding of the question. Short/ general answer, with very little accurate/ relevant own knowledge. Some unsupported assertions , with no real analysis .	0–3

Student answers

Those parts of the student answer which follow will have brief examiner's comments in the margins, as well as a longer overall comment at the end. Those parts that are particularly strong and well-focused will be **highlighted in red**. Errors/confusions/loss of focus will be **highlighted in blue**. In this way, you should find it easier to follow why marks were – or were not – awarded.

Question 1

'Appeasement was the main reason why Nazi Germany followed an aggressively expansionist foreign policy from 1933 to 1939.' To what extent do you agree with this statement? [15 marks]

Skill

Analysis/argument/evaluation

Examiner's tip

Look carefully at the wording of this question, which asks you to show **to what extent** you agree with the statement. To do this, you will need to examine a **range** of reasons – including appeasement – *and* evaluate their **relative** importance as causes of the foreign policy adopted by Nazi Germany in this period. Just focusing on one reason will not allow you to score the highest marks.

Student answer

There are many reasons why Nazi Germany followed an expansionist foreign policy from 1933–39. Apart from appeasement, many orthodox historians have argued that such policies were the result of Hitler's long-term foreign policy aims for 'Lebensraum' in eastern Europe. However, revisionist historians have instead insisted on the importance of a variety of other factors: such as the peace treaties of 1919–20, the impact of the Great Depression, and the weaknesses of the League of Nations.

Appeasement contributed to the foreign policy followed by Hitler after he came to power in 1933, because it led him to think that Britain and France would never oppose him, whatever

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

This is a clear introduction which is focused on the question, and which identifies a range of different reasons. It also shows some awareness of relevant historical debates connected to the topic.

he did. The problem of appeasement in the 1930s was mainly associated with Britain, which had always favoured a revision of some aspects of the peace treaties which ended the First World War. France, which was more prepared to resist Nazi Germany's actions, was only willing to do so if Britain supported it. This was because France had been badly weakened by the First World War, and needed Britain's military strength to be able to stand up to Hitler's Germany. But this was something that Britain's Conservative governments in the 1930s were not prepared to do. This was especially true of Neville Chamberlain's government which was in power from 1937–40. Because Britain and France decided to do nothing to stop him, Hitler was encouraged to keep breaking aspects of the Treaty of Versailles and expand German territory.

There were several reasons why British governments followed appeasement: as well as being weakened by the effects of the Great Depression, Chamberlain – like many of his generation – did not want to see another war like that of 1914–18. In addition, for much of the 1930s, opinion polls showed that the British public favoured disarmament; while Britain's Conservative government feared possible socialist revolution in parts of Europe – such as Spain – and so tended to see Nazi Germany as a block to such developments. This was why Britain pushed France into setting up a Non-Intervention Committee during the Spanish Civil War, instead of aiding the democratically-elected Popular Front government in Spain resist the military rising against it. Amongst other things, this policy prevented the government of Republican Spain from buying weapons: even when it was clear that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were both giving weapons and troops to help Franco and his Rebel army. This fear of communism was also why, when the Soviet Union proposed an alliance to resist Nazi Germany's breaches of the Treaty of Versailles, Britain refused to join such an alliance – even though France was prepared to do so, as long as Britain did too.

*Hitler's policy of gaining 'Lebensraum' was another reason behind the foreign policy followed by Germany after 1933. This aim had been stated by him early on – well before he came to power in 1933 – in his book, *Mein Kampf*, which he began writing as early as 1924 when he was in prison. This stated that Germany needed to expand in eastern Europe, in order to gain extra resources, and to provide land for German settlers. This long-term aim was behind the 1936 Four-Year Plan which he ordered Goring to carry out – this was to get Germany ready for war by 1940. Hitler's aggressive foreign policy was also shown by the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937. These were the notes of a meeting at which Hitler told his ministers and commanding officers to get Germany ready for invading countries in eastern Europe.*

Another reason for Hitler's expansionist foreign policy was to do with aspects of the Treaty of Versailles. As well as Hitler – and many Germans – seeing this treaty as being too harsh on Germany, Britain also felt it had been unfair. In fact, during the 1920s, British governments were prepared to consider revisions – which were put forward by democratic German politicians such as Stresemann. As a result, relations with Germany had improved after the invasion of the Ruhr by France and Belgium in 1923. There was the Locarno Treaty of 1925, by which Germany accepted its western borders – but said nothing about its eastern borders. Then, in 1928, Germany was one of many nations which signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, by which those countries promised not to use war as a way of settling disputes.

In addition, the League of Nations was weak – in part, because it had no armed force of its own, and in part because the USA and the Soviet Union were not members. As a result, the League depended on Britain and France to uphold the terms of the peace treaties. Italy was also a member – but, in the 1930s, Mussolini's Fascist Italy also began to follow an increasingly-expansionist foreign policy. This led to the break-up of the Stresa Front in 1935, after Italy's invasion of Abyssinia.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

The candidate has made a link to the question, and has provided some relevant and accurate supporting own knowledge to explain how appeasement encouraged Hitler to follow an expansionist foreign policy after 1933. However, there then follows a paragraph explaining the reasons for appeasement – although the own knowledge is accurate, it has not been made relevant by linking it to the question. Thus the candidate gains no marks for this second paragraph – and has also wasted valuable time.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

Again, there is some relevant focus, with some accurate own knowledge. However, although two other valid reasons are identified, there is no real attempt – so far – to evaluate their relative importance. In addition, although there is quite a lot of accurate information, it is not effectively tied to the question. As a result, the answer is beginning to become a list of reasons, rather than an analysis/evaluation of the relative importance of these reasons.

EXAMINER'S COMMENT

This answer has now become even more of a list of reasons – with little or no explicit attempts to link the points to the question. For instance, the League of Nations' paragraph doesn't explicitly state that this was a reason for Hitler's foreign policy. Also, the information about the effects of the Depression could have been linked to (a) Hitler's attempt to solve Germany's problems by increased spending on armaments and attempts to gain extra territories; and on Britain's decision to cut spending on weapons and so being less able to fight a war. This is a shame, as there is some relevant and precise own knowledge. In addition, there is no conclusion – this is where the candidate should have attempted an overall judgement about which reason was the most important one.

The Great Depression had a big negative impact on the countries of Europe. This began with the Wall Street Crash in the US in 1929, and was the result of speculation and over-production. As well as causing economic chaos in the US, it led the US to impose tariffs on foreign imports. This badly affected world trade, and led other countries to do the same. By 1932, there were over 6 million unemployed people in Germany – this was one of the reasons Hitler was able to come to power in 1933, because the Nazi Party was able to gain large votes in elections, making them the largest party in the German parliament. Britain and France were also badly affected; this led Britain to cut government spending – including on armaments. Also, all countries tended to follow their own interests, rather than cooperate with each other. Some then became increasingly aggressive as regards their foreign policies.

Overall examiner comments

This answer makes only a few attempts to explicitly address the question of which reason(s) was/were the most important one(s). There is plenty of precise/correct own knowledge – though some is irrelevant. The approach has been mainly to present a 'list' of reasons, with much of the supporting information not being 'pinned' to the question. Consequently, the answer is not good enough to go higher than Band 3 – probably getting 7 marks. To reach the higher Bands, more **explicit analysis of reasons – and evaluation of their relative importance** – are needed. Frustratingly, the candidate clearly has good knowledge, and some of the information needed to produce a good answer is already present.

Also, for Band 1, it would be necessary to have a little more **mention of relevant specific historians / historical interpretations** – there are several to choose from on this topic.

Activity

Look again at the simplified mark scheme and the student answer above. Now try to write a few extra paragraphs to push the answer up into Band 1, and so obtain the full 15 marks. As well as making sure you explicitly address **both** aspects of the question, try to integrate some references to relevant historians / historical interpretations.

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History

for the IB Diploma, Paper 1



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